

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW




*An American Quarterly
Devoted to Russia
Past and Present*

JANUARY

1961

Vol. 20, No. 1

Price \$1.25



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Vol. 20

January, 1961

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THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

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The purpose of *The Russian Review* is to interpret the real aims and aspirations of the Russian people, as distinguished from and opposed to Soviet Communism, and to advance general knowledge of Russian culture, history and civilization. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article of this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

Copyright 1961 by the Russian Review, Inc., 235 Baker Library, Hanover, N. H. Published quarterly in January, April, July and October. Second-class postage paid at Hanover, N. H., and at additional mailing offices. Subscription rates: \$5.00 a year in the United States; Canada \$5.50; foreign \$6.00; single issues through Vol. 12, \$1.00; subsequent single issues \$1.25. Cumulative Index to Vols. I-X (Nov. 1941, Oct. 1951), \$.75 per copy. The contents of this publication cannot be reprinted without permission of the editors. Unsolicited manuscripts will not be returned unless accompanied by stamped, self-addressed envelopes.

Communist Basic Tactics: Rule or Ruin

By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

WHEN Soviet Prime Minister Khrushchev interrupted United Nations discussion with shouted insults, emphasized once by banging his shoe on a desk, many observers perhaps thought this was merely an uncouth display of personal boorishness. But the explanation lies much deeper, in fundamental principles of Communist tactics for behavior in any non-Communist organization in which Communists may participate for purposes of infiltration. These tactics may be summed up in the phrase: rule or ruin. They were spelled out in great detail at the Second Congress of the Communist International, held in Moscow in July-August, 1920.

At this meeting Communists were given long specific instructions as to how they should act in parliaments, trade unions, and other "bourgeois" organizations to which they might obtain access. In the section of the "Theses and Statutes" of the Congress devoted to "The Party and Parliamentarism" one finds this revealing passage:

"Against participation in a political campaign one should not use the argument that parliament is a bourgeois government institution. The Communist Party enters such institutions not for the purpose of organization work, but in order to direct the masses to blow up the whole bourgeois machinery and the parliament itself from within."

The parliamentary delegation of the Communist Party in parliament is to be responsible not to the voters, but to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, which must have its

permanent representative in the parliamentary group with the right of veto. On all important political questions the parliamentary group shall get instructions from the Party Central Committee. Among the special obligations of a Communist member of parliament the following are laid down:

"Each candidate entered in the list of the Communists must sign a paper to the effect that at the first request of the Central Committee of the Party he shall be bound to give up his mandate (seat)."

"A Communist representative, by decision of the Central Committee, is bound to combine legal work with illegal work. In countries where the Communist delegate enjoys a certain inviolability this must be utilized by way of rendering assistance to the illegal organizations and for the propaganda of the Party."

"In the event of labor demonstrations in the streets or other revolutionary movements the Communist representative must occupy the most conspicuous place—at the head of the proletarian masses."

"Each Communist representative must remember that he is not a 'legislator' who is bound to seek agreement with the other legislators, but an agitator of the Party, detailed into the enemy's camp in order to carry out the orders of the Party there. The Communist member is answerable not to the wide mass of his constituents, but to his own Communist Party — whether legal or illegal." (Italics supplied.)

As examples of proper Communist behavior in parliamentary bodies are mentioned the work of the Bolsheviks in the Russian Imperial Duma, in the "Democratic Conference" and "Pre-Parliament," convened during the period of the Provisional Government, and in the Constituent Assembly, which the Bolsheviks (as the Communists were then called) dispersed with armed force when it refused to accept the Bolshevik program.

The Congress of the Comintern also worked out formulas

for infiltration of trade unions and exploiting them for Communist purposes. Complete unity of the trade unions with the Communist Party and subordination of the unions to the Party leadership are put forward as desirable goals in this connection. "For this purpose," the section devoted to "Trade Unions" states, "the Communists should have Communist factions in all the trade unions and factory committees and acquire by their means an influence over the labor movement and direct it."

The whole blueprint for ultimate conquest of the world issued by the Second Congress is suffused with a spirit of Machiavellian guile. Take, for example, this recommendation of tactics to be followed in promoting the revolutionary movement in what were then the colonial and semi-colonial countries of Asia and Africa. (Most of these countries became independent after the Second World War.) A devious, complicated strategy is outlined in the resolution on this subject:

"It is the duty of the Communist International to support the revolutionary movement in the colonies and in the backward countries . . . The Communist International must establish temporary relations and even unions with the revolutionary movements in the colonies and backward countries, without, however, amalgamating with them, but preserving the independent character of the proletarian movement, even though it be still in its embryonic state . . .

"The revolutionary movement in the colonies is not going to be a Communist revolution in its first stages. But if from the outset the leadership is in the hands of a Communist vanguard, the revolutionary masses will not be led astray, but may go ahead through the successive periods of development of revolutionary experience."

The phraseology is dry and complex. But the meaning is clear. The Communists, acting as a tightly disciplined minority group, are to enter revolutionary movements, such as the Chinese Kuomintang, the Indian National Congress and na-

tionalist movements in other countries ruled by overseas powers, go along with the struggle against "foreign imperialism," but retain their special organization, so that they may seize power at the first convenient opportunity. This is a precise forecast of the strategy followed by the Chinese Communists, under the coaching of Michael Borodin and other Soviet advisers, during the 'twenties.

Chiang Kai-shek perceived and frustrated this maneuver and drove the Communists out of the Kuomintang, which they had broadly infiltrated in 1926 and 1927. But the Second World War was as disastrous for China's attempt to create a non-Communist national government as the First World War was for the old Russian Empire. In India, so far, the independent nationalist forces have held Communism in check. But the strategy of penetration and manipulation of nationalist movements is being practiced today all over the world, not least in Africa and Latin America.

So, when Khrushchev directed the spotlight of attention to the United Nations by attending the autumn session of the General Assembly as head of the Soviet delegation and brought along an entourage of leaders of the satellite and neutralist states, he was not trying to raise the prestige of that organization. From the beginning he pursued historically familiar Communist rule-or-ruin tactics. Besides deliberately lowering the dignity of the UN and the seriousness of its proceedings by his clownish, rowdy antics, he deliberately aimed a blow at the office of the Secretary-General by proposing that its functions be shared by a triumvirate, with one representative of the Western powers, one of the Soviet bloc, one of the uncommitted neutrals.

Obviously any such division of power would paralyze the effectiveness of the office, because it would be a rare occasion, indeed, when the Soviet and Western representatives would agree. Khrushchev's proposals would carry over into the office

of the Secretary-General the built-in stalemate which already exists in the Security Council.

Khrushchev's ultimate hope, in line with basic Communist strategy, is to acquire in the United Nations a majority of Communist states and of states which are neutralist, but lean toward the Communist viewpoint on many issues. The realization of this hope is still far from accomplishment, because many of the new Asian and African nations, while dissociating themselves from taking any stand on the cold war, do not wish to compromise their independence by passing irrevocably into the camp of Moscow. Indeed the rulers of many of these economically underdeveloped states probably take a shrewd satisfaction in the prospect of inducing Moscow and Washington to offer them aid simultaneously.

So long as the Soviet Union cannot dominate the United Nations, Communist strategy calls for the paralyzing of that body. The Soviet Union wants a minimum of restraint on its possibilities of exploiting situations such as the breakdown of any semblance of orderly government in the Congo. Hence the proposal to install an unworkable triumvirate in the place of the single-headed office of Secretary-General.

Two other examples of Communist tactics employed when a direct seizure of power seems impracticable or inexpedient are the attempt to organize a "united front" and the promotion of the slogan "co-existence." United fronts became possible in some countries in the 'thirties, when the Communists dropped their ban on political combinations with non-Communist parties. Coalitions which included Communists came into power by election in France and Spain. In France the other partners in the coalition, the Radicals and the Socialists, became disillusioned and the experiment broke down. In Spain it touched off a bitter civil war, which ended with the establishment of the dictatorship of General Franco.

United fronts multiplied in Europe immediately after the

war, when Communists sat in governments in France, Italy and Belgium and the various countries in the area under Soviet military occupation, where the local Communist parties, except in Czechoslovakia, were very small, started out as professed coalitions. Within a few years, however, the "united front" had disappeared as a viable political idea. The Communists were out of the governments in Western Europe. Behind the Iron Curtain the Communists were all-powerful; the coalitions had disappeared or had become transparent covers for Communist rule. This was scarcely surprising to students of Communist theory and practice.

The Bulgarian Communist, Georgi Dimitrov, speaking at the Seventh Congress of the Communist International, held in Moscow in 1935, characterized united front government as "one of the most important transitional forms from bourgeois democracy to communist dictatorship." The purpose of such a government is for the Communist ministers to "carry out revolutionary demands" and arm the proletariat.¹

Strangely enough, despite the obvious bankruptcy of the united front in Europe, despite the fact that all such experiments ended in Communist domination or in Communist exclusion, the United States, through the mission to China headed by the late General George C. Marshall, tried unsuccessfully to bring about the repetition of this futile and dangerous experiment in China. In view of past experience with Communist methods of infiltration and pulling strings from within the Kuomintang, it is not surprising that Chiang Kai-shek was extremely skeptical about the possibility of genuine political cooperation with them. The present Chinese Communist dictator, Mao Tse-tung, in his book *China's New Democracy*, published in 1940, gives an interesting outline of how Communists propose

¹Georgi Dimitrov, *The United Front, the Struggle Against Fascism and War*, International Publishers, 1938, pp. 74 ff.

to exploit coalition governments emerging from united fronts, which may be summarized as follows:²

Lenin insisted on the usefulness of Communist participation in parliaments. There is an even greater revolutionary usefulness in Communist participation in governments. United fronts and coalition cabinets constitute an effective device to split the opposition, isolate the anti-Communists, gain non-Communist support and make full use of all 'progressive' movements.

There is no valid excuse if certain political figures and leaders of thought in non-Communist countries are ignorant of fundamental Communist purposes and designs. For there has never been a more open conspiracy. There is no reason to resort to the testimony of secret agents or disillusioned ex-Communists to obtain information about Communist strategy and tactics; one need only read the writings of Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Tse-tung and the official, published resolutions of Communist international congresses. Every cunning, deceitful maneuver is spelled out in detail and in advance.

One of the latest maneuvers has been to profess devotion to the ideal of co-existence. This has been hailed in some credulous, eager-to-be-deceived circles in the West as something new and hopeful. But, as interpreted in practice by Khrushchev, it is nothing new at all. It means that Communists will be free to carry on with their subversive propaganda throughout the world, with their attempts to nibble at exposed outposts of the non-Communist world, while corresponding action on the part of non-Communist countries is supposedly barred as inconsistent with the magic formula, "co-existence." On this point the eminent British scholar in Russian and Soviet history, Professor Hugh Seton-Watson, offers some very wise and true observations in one of his recent books:³

"Cold war is not a Western policy, but a state of affairs, and

²Stefan T. Possony, *A Century of Conflict*, Regnery, 1953, p. 211.

³*Neither War Nor Peace*, Praeger, 1960, pp. 256, 257.

results from the basic Soviet attitude. The Soviet Union is in a permanent state of war, which may or may not become violent, with the West"

"There is not necessarily any harm in using their phrase, 'peaceful co-existence,' provided that it is understood that peaceful co-existence and cold war are exactly the same thing . . . It is only when it is believed in the West that 'peaceful co-existence' is something new, denotes a change of heart in the Soviet leaders and a desire for true friendship with non-controlled governments and nations that harm is done. Provided that this error is avoided, there is no reason why the West should not successfully endure the condition of permanent warfare without shooting war, and survive until, whether through evolution or revolution, men come to power in the Soviet Union who genuinely renounce totalitarian imperialism."

Khrushchev's shoe-banging at the United Nations is only the latest manifestation of a "rule or ruin" Communist psychology which fully justifies the realistic warnings of Professor Seton-Watson.

Vladimir Soloviev and Slavophilism

By JANKO LAVRIN

THE division between the Westerners and the Slavophiles in Russia was symbolic of that dichotomy, or inner split-up, of the Russian consciousness which, after the reforms of Peter the Great, became inevitable. Like Janus, Russia has ever since had two faces—one looking toward the West, and the other looking not so much to the East as away from the West and into her own national and cultural character. Slavophile apprehensions that a thoroughly Westernized Russia might become only a second- or third-rate Europe were not directed against the West as such, but against the *trend* its development had taken during the last few centuries; namely, the trend of a colossal civilization growing at the expense of man's inner culture. In short, that secularization of culture which in Western Europe had begun with the Renaissance was regarded by the Slavophiles as a danger precisely because they refused to separate culture from the deeper religious and spiritual values. This was the reason why Kireevsky, for instance, asserted that although *quantitatively* Russian culture might lag far behind that of Europe, its *trend* was the right one and it was therefore better in quality.

True enough, Peter the Great had imposed a belated process of secularization upon Russia also; but that process was confined only to the upper classes, whereas the vast peasant communities remained practically untouched by it. In fact, they alone preserved the pre-Petrine religiosity the embodiment of which they saw in the Orthodox Church. To deprive the Russian people of this by turning them into "Europeans" would mean nothing less than to infect them with that smug materialism and worship of money rampant in the Western world —

labelled by the Slavophiles as "decaying." Their logical conclusion was that instead of teaching Russia, the West itself might even eventually be led by Russia onto the right path—away from a materialistic and "fragmented" humanity.

There were, however, three snags in the doctrine of the Slavophiles. One was their confusion of religion not so much with the idealized, but with the official, Orthodox Church—that very Church which Belinsky had lashed so cruelly in his letter to Gogol and which Dostoevsky himself once marked as "paralyzed since Peter the Great." The second snag was the Slavophile search for an ideal in the past (usually in a romanticized past) and not in the future. And last but not least, the Slavophile insistence that in essentials Russia was not only different from, but also superior to, Europe harbored the danger of national complacency or even of that intolerance which brought the later Slavophiles very close to "official" patriots and reactionaries. Nor should one overlook the fact that their sympathies with the other Slavs—those living in Austria and in the Turkish empire of that day, were based on *pia desideria* rather than on real knowledge of those populations. What could have been more "Western" from a Slavophile point of view than the Czechs, for instance, not to mention the permanent stumbling-block in all those theories—the Poles?

The Slavophiles, with Dostoevsky in the first line, had their heyday during the Russo-Turkish War in 1877-78. Public opinion in Russia was stirred to such a degree by their propaganda to liberate "our Orthodox Slav brothers" from the Turkish yoke as to virtually compel the government to declare war on Turkey. Yet the anticlimax which came during and after the Berlin Congress in 1878 frustrated too many hopes cherished by the Slavophiles, whose messianic ideology now began to recede, or else affiliated itself more and more with doctrines foreign to the spirit of its founders.

It was not unexpected that during the Russo-Turkish cam-

paign Slavophilism and "patriotic" imperialism should have joined hands. Thus in Dostoevsky's articles in *An Author's Diary* for the period there is hardly a distinction made between the two. His dream of a cross on St. Sophia in Constantinople was certainly not of a purely religious nature. But such dreams were of long standing, and Slavophilism itself was often used as a sanction for imperialism pure and simple. Thus General Rostislav Fadeev championed in his one-time sensational pamphlet, "Opinion on the Eastern Question" (1869), a Pan-slav federation with Constantinople as its capital and extending from the Adriatic to the Pacific.

In the same year there appeared the provocative study *Russia and Europe*, with the subtitle: *An Enquiry into the Cultural and Political Relations between the Slavs and the Germano-Latin World*. Its author, Nikolai Danilevsky (1882-85), a biologist by profession and a Slavophile by sympathies, was anxious here to put forward the "biological" reasons why Russia and the Slavs should ultimately triumph over the West. Dismissing the idea of a united humanity as sheer nonsense, he believed in the existence of a number of cultural-historical types, independent of each other and subject to the biological process of youth, manhood, old age, and death. He analyzes ten such types, beginning with the Egyptian and ending with the Germano-Latin or European type. But according to him, the European type had already left its blossoming period behind and was now at its unavoidable stage of decay.¹ To Russia, as the leader of her natural allies the Slavs (minus the Poles), belonged the future. After the forthcoming liquidation of Turkey and Austria, the Magyars, the Rumanians, and the Greeks, although different from the Slav race, would be hitched as

¹The similarity between Danilevsky's theory and that of Oswald Spengler in his *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* has often been pointed out. Yet the idea had first been put forward in 1857 by the German historian Heinrich Ruckert in his *Lehrbuch der Weltgeschichte*.

"satellites" to the Panslav federation, with Constantinople as its capital.

Considerably later (1885-86), there appeared the equally provocative work, *The East, Russia and Slavdom*, by Konstantin Leontiev. By a strange freak of fate Leontiev combined a rather voluptuous and nervous temperament with great admiration for the severe Byzantine pattern of existence. Perhaps he found in its rigidity a counterpoise to his own unbalanced nature. He was above all an aesthetic type with an almost pathological spite for the bourgeois mentality and the bourgeois way of life. Beauty, preferably tragic beauty, he regarded as the essence of life, even if this should entail social inequality, suffering, and injustice. To him human beings were only the material out of which a beautiful and dignified form of existence should be fashioned by means of the severest self-discipline after the Byzantine pattern. The State itself should become not a democratic institution, but one of unlimited power, majesty, and beauty.

It is easy to see that Leontiev was a kind of Nietzsche in the garb of a Byzantine monk. (He actually became a monk shortly before his death at the age of sixty.) His hatred of the West was due not so much to any Slavophile orientation as to his contempt for the European middle classes, whose existence he identified with vulgarity, drabness, and the general uglification of life—all, according to him, symptoms of decay. Far from admiring the reforms initiated by Alexander II, he was afraid that Russia herself might become a prey to democratic institutions and thus degenerate, together with the rest of Europe. He would not hear of a union between Russia and the other Slavs, because these he regarded as not only culturally different, but also imbued with all sorts of dangerous democratic tendencies and ways of life. He actually thought that by incorporating within her boundaries the Austrian and Balkan Slavs, Russia would become infected with their liberal-democratic ideas

which would eventually spell her ruin. Constantinople should be aimed at as a future capital not of a Slav federation (as Fadeev and Danilevsky envisioned), but of a self-contained Russia, grown powerful within a rigidly Byzantine pattern.

These and some other reactionary currents which claimed relationship with Slavophile doctrines were enough to provoke a deservedly sharp criticism. And the man best qualified for such a task was the philosopher Vladimir Soloviev (1835-1900). In the first place, he himself had been, at an early stage of his development, under a strong influence of Slavophile ideas. Moreover, whatever his further changes and mutations, the basis of his philosophy remained to the end that Christian universalism which had been preached by such early Slavophiles as Kireevsky and Khomyakov. Soloviev aimed at an integration of religion and culture as the only outlet from the blind-alley into which mankind had been seduced by a civilization developing at the expense of man's moral progress. Like the best of the Slavophiles, he thought that the problem of all problems was whether humanity ultimately is to become an organism guided by spiritual forces from within, or a mere organization ruled (with a totalitarian iron rod, if necessary) from without. This is what the antithesis of Christ and Antichrist meant to him symbolically.

Aware of the dichotomy in the Russian consciousness, Soloviev wanted to overcome it not by pitting Russia against Europe, but by a synthesis of the two—the kind of synthesis Dostoevsky mentioned in his Pushkin Speech (1880). This was one of the reasons that Soloviev dealt so severely with some of the later Slavophiles, or would-be Slavophiles, beginning with Danilevsky. In an essay bearing the same title as Danilevsky's book, he actually denounced (in 1888) the whole of the latter's theory of autonomous cultural types as false even historically. Was not the Roman Empire a collection of ever so many minor cultures merging in one universal culture? Outside that uni-

versal culture there were only a few sterile cultural types or just savages. In his further statements Soloviev contends that Russia herself owed all her significant achievements in history and culture only to her collaboration with Europe. Nor are there any pure or exclusive cultural types either in Europe or anywhere else in the world. Another mistake made by Danilevsky was to lump the Russians and the Slavs together even while excluding the Poles. Can there be a greater difference than that between the Russians and the Catholic Slavs? Why, even the Orthodox Serbs and Bulgarians have a culture which is different from that of the Russians.

True enough, the best of the Slavophiles did not stop at the Slavs. They saw in these only their nearest allies in the task of that national mission of Russia which should aim at an eventual union of all men and nations in the name of Christian universalism. Yet Soloviev made a sharp distinction between a mission which aims at national self-realization in the service of humanity, and one whose task is mere national self-assertion at the expense of humanity.

Soloviev dealt with the various aspects of this dilemma in his book *The National Problems in Russia*, the second edition of which (1888) was provided with a valuable preface. While agreeing with certain tenets of the early Slavophiles, especially with their insistence that politics should not be divorced from moral values, he yet criticized, and devastatingly so, those representatives of the Slavophile movement who saw in the mission of Russia a national privilege and the self-glorification of a "chosen people" rather than an obligatory service to humanity as a whole. Their claim that Russia should hold the central position in world history he regarded as both presumptuous and dangerous. Nor did he revel in Orthodoxy (however much idealized by some Slavophiles) as a special attribute of the Russian people. On the contrary, he pointed out with great acumen, all the weaknesses of the Orthodox Church, no-

tably her servility towards the State. He had no sympathies with pre-Petrine Russia either, and said quite frankly that by transferring their ideal into the Russian past the Slavophiles had turned it into a false ideal.

The severest criticism of the later Slavophiles can be found, however, in Soloviev's polemical essay *Ideals and Idols* (1891), a kind of *post mortem* of the movement which, in his opinion, had already disintegrated. Some of its elements had been absorbed by the Western current, others by populism, reactionary obscurantism, even by anti-Semitism. But if so, he concludes, then the Slavophile movement has ceased to be an organic phenomenon; it has, in fact, ceased to exist.

As a religious thinker, Soloviev was far from sharing the Slavophile (and for that matter Dostoevsky's) prejudice against Catholicism. He was on very friendly terms with the famous Croat Bishop Strossmayer and even stayed, for quite a long time, as his guest at Djakovo, where he wrote his treatise *The Future of Theocracy*. Moreover, the treatise itself was first printed not in Russia but in Zagreb—at Strossmayer's expense. Knowing only too well the weaknesses of the single separate Christian denominations, Soloviev hoped for a renewal of the true Christian spirit from a reunion of the Churches. It was in this sense that he wrote his French book *La Russie et l'église universelle* (1889). He also championed such a reunion in his quaintly apocalyptic and even prophetic work, *Three Conversations*.

While Slavophilism itself was already in a process of disintegration, Soloviev took over and deepened the religious kernel of the early Slavophiles. In his dream of an organic synthesis of the philosophic, scientific, and Christian-religious thought, Soloviev was anxious, from the start of his philosophic career, to "bring all elements of human existence—individual and social—into the right relation with the ultimate principle of all

life, and through it and in it also to a harmonious relation with each other."

But such had been the aim of Kireevsky and Khomyakov as well, although neither of them had put it so clearly and so many-sidedly as Soloviev. And instead of entirely discarding, he only corrected even the Slavophile idea of a Russian mission. He thought that the Russian people, with its blend of the contemplative power of the East and the action principle of the West, was eminently suited for providing a synthesis of the two. Yet he regarded the possible historical mission of Russia as only *one* of the factors in the universal union of mankind aimed at in the future, and even this on condition that her political power, too, should be in the service of such a union. Soloviev can be regarded as a link between what was really valuable in the Slavophile ideology on the one hand, and such religious-philosophic thinkers as Berdyaev, Bulgakov, and a number of others. Nor was his impact even upon modern Russian poetry without significance. The two leaders of the specifically Russian Symbolism, Alexander Blok and Andrey Bely, were both indebted to Soloviev the thinker and the poet. His is one of those influences which emerge again and again, especially in periods of vital inner quest. And has there ever been a period more in need of such a quest than our atomic age?

Recent Changes in Soviet Education

By KENNETH DAILEY

A SERIES of pronouncements emanating from Moscow in 1958 seemed to foreshadow profound changes in the Soviet educational system. Almost immediately two schools of thought developed among Western observers as to the significance of these changes. Mr. Nicholas DeWitt stated flatly that "the United States is losing the battle of mathematics, science, and teacher training"; that the changes sponsored by Khrushchev had not weakened Soviet education; and that Soviet schools seemed to be able to impart the traditional subject matter along with a liberal dose of production training. On the other hand, Mr. Irving R. Levine has written convincingly about the sad state of education in the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's changes are, according to Levine, merely symptomatic of deep and abiding dislocation in the whole Soviet educational apparatus.¹

There is no doubt that much has been commendable in Soviet education. Almost every scholar who has studied the subject has noted several positive aspects. First of all, the problem of pupil motivation has been solved by the Soviet schools to a much greater degree than here in America. Strong prestige factors and economic motives seem to drive students in the Soviet Union to do well in school. So many Soviet youths wanted to go on to higher education that there were simply not enough places for them in the *vuzy* (higher educational establishments). By Khrushchev's own admission, something had to be done about this problem. Second, at least in theory, Soviet

¹Nicholas DeWitt, "Polytechnical Education and the Soviet School Reform," *Harvard Educational Review*, Spring, 1960.

Irving Levine, "Trouble in Russia's Red Schoolhouses," *The New Leader*, June 8, 1959.

education has been highly competitive. One attained entrance to a *vuz* only after having passed stiff competitive examinations. Thus, the able student seems to gain the recognition to which his abilities and hard work entitles him. Almost every American who has traveled in the Soviet Union in the past few years has testified to the universal regard which the Soviet people have for scholars and scholarship. Several have reported that when they told a Soviet citizen that they were professors, they were treated with a dignity and with almost a reverence that they had never experienced in the United States.

Medals and decorations for superior scholarship are eagerly sought after by Soviet students. The gentleman's C is not a popular grade in Soviet universities. A very high percentage of students in Soviet universities are subsidized to some extent by the state. Tuition is free of charge and stipends are increased by as much as 25% for meritorious academic performance. Outstanding teachers are honored. Soviet professors are very comfortably off compared with other groups in their society. They are paid handsomely for learned articles in journals or symposia. A Soviet professor may earn up to 150,000 rubles (about \$15,000 in American money) for writing a textbook that is accepted. If he is fortunate enough to win a prize for his work, this money is tax exempt. American scientists who have visited their Soviet colleagues all testify to their material well-being.

Yet, in spite of the high regard accorded Soviet education in recent years by the non-Communist world, Mr. Khrushchev made it plain that he and his associates in the Party and in the government were far from satisfied with the state of Soviet education. At the 13th Congress of the Komsomol (April, 1958) Khrushchev indicated that the educational system of the U. S. S. R. had to be shaken up. He suggested that the 10-year school, which had been pushed at both the 19th and the 20th Party Congresses, be replaced by a new 7-year or 8-year school,

which would become the basic unit in the Soviet educational system. Khrushchev said that he was unhappy with a system that was divorced from life.

During the summer of 1958, there was apparently a lot of serious discussion of educational policy in the top echelons of the Party and the government. In September, 1958, *Pravda* published a long note which had been approved by the Presidium of the Central Committee. This note repeated many of the points that Khrushchev had made in his speech to the Komsomol Congress. It called attention to discrepancies in Soviet education and it suggested changes.

Pravda, on November 16, 1958, devoted the bulk of its issue to a long article, "On the Strengthening of Ties with Life and on the Further Development of Public Education," which contained forty-eight theses on education. These theses, previously approved by the Central Committee of the Party and by the Council of Ministers of the U. S. S. R., praised the cultural revolution that had taken place in the Soviet state. Glowing tribute was also given to the splendid achievements in the national economy of the U. S. S. R., with the Communist Party and its Leninist Central Committee given principal credit. It was indicated that a new 7-Year Plan was to be revealed to the country at the forthcoming Extraordinary 21st Party Congress. To keep Soviet education in step with these developments, the theses set forth certain reforms that had to be accomplished.

Khrushchev had suggested, in his speech to the Komsomol Congress, that either a 7-year or an 8-year school was to become the basic unit in the country's educational system. The theses definitely stated that it should be an 8-year school. In this school Soviet children would get not only the traditional formal education, but also training which would enable them to take their places in the country's productive apparatus. The second thesis quoted with approval Khrushchev's statement: "Every young man, every girl must train themselves for labor,

which has the purpose of creating values useful for man and for society. Everyone must, irrespective of his parent's position, have a single road in front of him—to go forth and to learn, and having learned, to work." When Khrushchev said that education was divorced from life, it was apparent that he meant divorced from production.

Marx, Engels, and Lenin were quoted to buttress Khrushchev's position; so, also, were such political and social theorists as Campanella, Fourier, Robert Owen, and "that great Russian revolutionary democrat Chernyshevsky," all of whom were alleged to have supported the idea that in the future ideal society "under socialism, schooling would be closely linked with productive labor."

After having alleged that education, especially in the three upper grades of the 10-year school, was divorced from life, the theses stated that in the new 8-year school education would be combined with training in useful practical work. In small communities where it would not be feasible to maintain an 8-year school, only the first four grades should be taught. When the students had completed these grades, the theses suggested that they be transported to the nearest 8-year school where they could finish what was called an "incomplete, secondary, general education, labor polytechnical school."

The theses also noted that special attention had to be paid to the teaching of physics, mathematics, chemistry, designing, and biology. Every school was ordered to improve radically its teaching of foreign languages. A troublesome problem with language teaching was admitted. In some of the Union and Autonomous Republics a school child was expected to take three languages: the language of the area, Russian, and another foreign language. This had been caused in part by the constitutional guarantee of education in the native language. The theses stated that considerable thought was being given to whether the child's parents should not be granted the right to

send the child to a school of their own choice. According to the choice, a child attending a native language school might elect Russian as his second language, while one attending a Russian language school might elect his native language to fulfill his language requirement.

Parents, teachers, and administrators were told that they must improve the habits of children placed in their charge, and that they must inculcate cultured behavior among children. The Pioneers and the Komsomols were directed to lead in implementing the suggested changes. The Union Republics were ordered "to establish by law the compulsory character of the 8-year school." All children from seven to sixteen must attend school and "the Central Statistical Administration of the U. S. S. R. and its organs in local areas must improve the registration of children and teen-agers of school age." In the Eastern Republics of the U. S. S. R., it was directed that more young women must complete school.

The theses raised the question of shortcomings in pedagogical sciences, of poor and insufficient textbooks, and other basic questions. The Academy of Pedagogical Sciences was commissioned to work out a theory of Soviet pedagogy. It was strongly indicated that there were not sufficient numbers of industrial arts teachers. This shortcoming was ordered eliminated as quickly as possible. The theses ordered that the transition to the new system of formal education combined with production practice had to be carried out smoothly, with strict attention to local peculiarities and needs. Ten-year schools were to be maintained in some areas to assure a flow of qualified student personnel into the *vuzy*. A transition period of four to five years was allotted to complete the implementation of the reform.

Technical and higher education were also dealt with in detail. The important point was that all the way through his education, the Soviet student had to do practical work. In the *vuzy*,

where a student might be studying chemistry, physics, or some other subject that entailed a great deal of theoretical and laboratory work, he might be excused from the obligation to do practical work for a period of two years. In his last three years in a *vuz*, however, he must combine his formal education with productive practice.

Inasmuch as the student who completes the new 8-year school will have only an incomplete secondary education when he is injected into the productive apparatus, he must take steps to complete his education while he is working. This, it seems, is a major change. The theses provide students with several alternatives to accomplish this last stage of secondary education. They are expected to carry on education while they are working and great stress is laid upon evening and correspondence courses. Plants and farms are to maintain schools which workers may attend. *Vtuzy* (higher technical educational establishments) are to be set up in connection with industry. Some of the students may go on to *tekhnikumy* where they may complete their secondary education and be awarded the title of "Specialist of Medium Classification." Some of the existing labor reserve schools are to be retained for the next three to five years so that youths graduating from the 10-year schools will be able to enter technical trade schools. Girls are especially urged to enter these labor schools for training in public service, trade, and production practice.

The *shkoly internaty* (boarding schools) about which Khrushchev first spoke at the 20th Party Congress are to be widely extended. According to the theses, these schools may have either an 8-year or an 11-year program. These boarding schools are supposed to set a shining example of how training for useful work can be combined with formal education. There are also to be special schools for students with talents for music, choreography, or the arts. There must be production training in these special schools and, as in the case of the boarding schools, par-

ents of students enrolled in such schools are expected to pay tuition in accordance with their ability to pay.

These theses on popular education were enacted into a new education law on December 24, 1958 by the Supreme Soviet. The text of this new law was published completely by *Pravda* on the next day. Close examination of the new law reveals little substantial change from the theses on education. There was enough criticism of the law by Soviet citizens and by foreign experts to lead Khrushchev to defend it vigorously in his opening speech to the Extraordinary 21st Party Congress. The Minister of Higher Education, Yelyutin, also devoted a considerable part of his speech to the Party Congress to the defense of the new law.²

Some of the Soviet's educational problems, as well as many of their attempted solutions, reappear like hardy perennials. The 1958 law contained few truly new approaches or principles. There were precedents for every problem and for every projected action. Many of the so-called changes had been enacted piecemeal during the preceding five years. Even the "new" emphasis on "practical education" was a rehash. As early as October, 1918, the new Soviet regime decreed the establishment of a Uniform Labor School based upon the "Labor Principle." Students were to be instructed in all subjects and in manual labor. Khrushchev himself once attended one of the famous *Rabfacs*. In 1928, students were ordered to spend one week in industry for every two weeks in class.

Another familiar feature has been the continuation of multiple session schools despite decrees to the contrary. According to a 1935 decree, all double and triple sessions were to be ended in all major cities by 1937. Yet, as late as 1956, it was reported in a Moscow published book *Cultural Construction in the*

²*Vneocherednoi XXI S'ezd K.P.S.S., Stenograficheskii Otchet*, vol. I, pp. 58-60, and vol II, pp. 145-151.

U. S. S. R., that over a thousand Soviet schools were on a three-shift basis, and over half were on a two-shift program.

The Soviets have not yet achieved full success with any major educational reform or plan. *Cultural Construction in the U. S. S. R.* makes it abundantly plain that a majority of Soviet schools in 1956 were still of the one-room, one-teacher type which enrolled an average of twenty students. Spokesmen at the 19th Party Congress announced that 10-year education was to become universal in the U. S. S. R. but at the 20th Party Congress it was announced that 10-year education would become universal within ten years. Khrushchev, speaking to the Extraordinary 21st Party Congress, confirmed what foreign specialists had suspected for years, namely, that the goal for the 10-year schools was only thirty to forty percent achieved, and that the goal for the more common 7-year schools was only seventy to eighty percent realized.

The changes announced in 1958 had actually been in preparation for a long time. On August 4, 1954, *Pravda* announced new curricula in the Soviet schools. New regulations provided that children be taught to work with the hands. Handicrafts were to be introduced into the first and fourth grades. Children were to be taught to fabricate various objects from wood and from paper, while practical work was to be stepped up in all grades. The time spent on such subjects as chemistry and physics, especially in laboratory work, was to be considerably increased. The time allowed for such subjects as literature, general studies, and biology was to be sharply curtailed. Pupils in the fifth grade were to spend two hours a week in the school garden or in the school workshops. They were also to learn how to use an abacus and how to survey their locality. Draftsmanship was to be introduced as a required subject in the seventh and eighth grades.

In April, 1956, a reporter from the *New York Times* visited School 658 in the industrial Kiev suburb of Moscow. Here he

saw children of six and seven being given manual training. The children who started their training by modeling clay and cardboard, finished their education with the capability of making simple electrical repairs and installing automobile replacement parts. B. T. Maltseva, Principal of School 658, told the reporter: "All of our graduates used to enroll for higher education. Last year only 75% of our 201 graduates went on for higher education. The rest went directly to the factories or to the farms." Maltseva indicated that these students went willingly to this work. She also indicated that all of the students from the upper three grades had spent the previous summer working in factories or on farms. The school had a machine shop where the upper grade students worked and a vegetable garden where all of the students spent time seeding, hoeing, or weeding.³

Severe criticism of Soviet schools in 1955-56 was carried in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, May 10, 1956, in a letter signed by nine prominent physicians and pediatricians, most of them residents of the Ukraine. They stated that overwork produced among students chronic exhaustion, frequent headaches, and weakened memory and vision. They asserted that the average working day for children from ten to thirteen years of age was eight to ten hours. Teenagers, fifteen to seventeen, were worked ten to twelve hours a day. In specialized schools for art and for music, pupils spent from fourteen to sixteen hours a day on their lessons. The doctors also charged that teachers assigned additional homework which they themselves could not complete in six hours. The manner in which "polytechnization" was being implemented came in for criticism. Finally the physicians complained that they had been ordered, by the Ministry of Health, to increase the numbers of school children for whom they were responsible medically from between one thousand to fifteen hundred to about twenty-five hundred.

³*The New York Times*, April 15, 1956.

At the 20th Party Congress, Khrushchev called for the creation of a nation-wide network of boarding schools. He described these schools in glowing terms and compared them to the schools which had been maintained in Tsarist Russia for the Corps of Pages. Some foreign observers immediately concluded that these exclusive schools were for the children of the Soviet elite. *The New York Times* reported from Moscow, on August 19, 1956, that administrative bungling and inertia, a lack of qualified teachers, and a lack of buildings and equipment were causing serious difficulties in the new schools. Priorities were set up for admission to these boarding schools. War orphans would be taken first, next children whose parents were crippled by war or in industrial accidents. The next two categories to be admitted were children from large families or from broken homes. For children from these four groups, the Soviet government would defray the tuition charges. Only after these groups had been taken care of would other children be admitted as tuition-paying students, the charges being levied in accordance with the ability of the parents to pay.

It was amply evident that these new schools were tied into the Soviet leaders' pet project of "polytechnization." On November 21, 1956, one of the *Times* correspondents in Moscow visited Boarding School 12, situated in an old school building on the industrial right bank of the Moskva River. It was a far cry from the lavish schools which Khrushchev had projected. V. P. Ilyin, principal of the school, described the daily routine of the students, being careful to emphasize that the school specialized in metal-working and machine shop practice. Automobile mechanics and other subjects with direct practical application were also taught. The student body consisted of 240 boys and girls who had been selected by a committee of the Borough Soviet from among some 1,000 who had made application. The girls who were admitted were taught sewing, carpentry, and other practical arts. Ilyin admitted that the tight

schedule and the heavy routine of his school did not allow much time for purely scholastic pursuits. He stated that the teachers were trying to cover all materials during the class periods, because there was little time available to do homework. There seems little question that these students will go directly into production, and that few, if any, of them will ever be enrolled in a *vuz*.⁴

Even before the 1958 law on education, Soviet universities had been subjected to changes in regulations. In August, 1956, a Plenum of the Central Committee approved the first changes in nearly twenty years in the rules for granting graduate academic degrees. There had been many complaints in the Soviet press to the effect that those who were granted graduate degrees did not measure up to their responsibilities in the national economy. The quality of dissertations was often criticized. In an effort to eliminate some of the faults, it was ordered that candidates for the degree of Doctor of Science were not, in the future, to spend two years in intensive research and writing. Rather, they were to complete this work while on assignment to teaching or other research work.

In regard to the *Kandidat* degree, except for studies in a few specified fields such as physics or mathematics, a graduate student was not to be accepted for degree work until he had completed two years of practical work. In addition, the requirement for a dissertation for the degree of *Kandidat* in the physical sciences was eliminated. To tighten requirements, a Central Certification Board of seventy-seven members was appointed. No dissertation would be accepted until it had been approved by this board. Furthermore, if any dissertation were accepted by a degree-granting institution, and if it were later rejected by the Central Certification Board, said institution would be deprived of the right to accept new candidates for graduate work for a period of up to two years.

⁴*Ibid.*, December 9, 1956.

In March, 1957, *Molodoi Kommunist* announced new regulations which later seemed to have foreshadowed Khrushchev's program of 1958. *Vuzy* were ordered to give priority to candidates for admission who had practical work experience on farms or in factories. Up to 60% of those candidates who passed entrance examinations were to be admitted without further examination if they had the required two years of working experience. In addition the examinations were to be made easier for those students who had been working while they studied.

An article in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, April 24, 1957, written by an official of the Ministry of State Security, Naboka, bluntly stated an unpleasant truth which Khrushchev was to repeat the next year. More than half of the 1,300,000 who would be graduated from the 10-year schools in 1957 would not be allowed to enter *vuzy* but would have to go directly to industry or agriculture. The *vuzy* had places for only 220,000 students, and this figure included those in evening and correspondence courses. Technical institutes would be able to take only an additional 300,000. This article stated forthrightly that, of these students accepted, over two-thirds would have to combine education with jobs in production. On April 26, 1957, *Pravda* published an article by N. M. Zhaverenko, Director of the Mendeleev Institute for Chemical Technology, which had disturbing overtones for those students who wanted to get their education in a metropolitan atmosphere. In line with the established policy of economic decentralization, Zhaverenko said, many schools would have to be moved from Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and other large cities to unspecified industrial areas.

On January 29, 1960, *Izvestiya* told of plans by the Ministry of Higher Education and Secondary Specialized Education to organize *vtuzy* and evening specialized divisions of the *vuzy* in some major industrial plants. Among the factories affected by these plans would be the Likhachev Motor Factory (formerly

the Stalin Factory), the Leningrad Metallurgical Institute, Rostov-on-Don Agricultural Machinery Plant (Rostselmash), and the Dzerzhinsky Metallurgical Plant at Dneprodzerzhinsk. Directors of these establishments were ordered to assign quarters for study purposes, to allot necessary equipment for laboratories and offices, and to perform economic servicing and repair of study facilities at the expense of the enterprise. It was also announced that the scientific work of the professors and instructors of these *vtuzy* would be carried out according to a systematic plan connected with the assigned tasks of the enterprises.

Specialists from these factories were to be recruited for instruction and teaching from among the production and scientific specialists of the enterprises. School work was to be conducted both during regular working hours and after hours in a course of studies designed to last five and one-half to six years.

According to *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, February 10, 1960, the Tadzhik Central Committee and the Union Republic's Council of Ministers ordered the Tadzhik Ministry of Education and other appropriate agencies to develop the training of 24,000 industrial workers and 84,000 agricultural workers over the next two years. This was to be done in a system of vocational and technical schools. Reports to the 13th Tadzhik Party Congress were highly critical of the school system, and, in particular, these reports stressed the need of getting qualified personnel into teaching. The primary schools must now be staffed with instructors who had at least a secondary specialized education—high school graduates.

In Latvia, Khrushchev's hand-picked sycophant, Comrade Pelshe, in a report to the Latvian Party Congress, demanded that the recent changes in regard to education be implemented forthwith. According to *Sovetskaya Latvija*, February 17, 1960, Pelshe charged that Latvian *vuzy* were not meeting the requirements of enrolling youth with production experience in a satisfactory fashion. At the Latvian State University named for

P. Stuchka, only 11% of the students admitted to the first class had production experience.

Pravda, on March 10, 1960, published a bitingly sarcastic report by A. Mustevoi, Director of Moscow's School 330. Mustevoi charged that technical training was being done at random with little or no regard for real needs. He demanded that a long-range plan for the training of students be worked out with planning organizations, representatives from the Moscow *Sovnarkhoz*, and Moscow's educational people participating in these planning sessions. He complained bitterly: "Some workers do not instruct the youngsters but use them as helpers or simply ask them to take a walk and not to take adults away from their work. Foremen and workers rarely assemble the youths in training to talk to them about their education." As might be expected, Mustevoi called for an end to interdepartmental red tape.

One can find many examples of these highly critical comments. Two Armenian Communists, Megrabyan and Topchyan, reported in *Kommunist*, March 15, 1960, that 336 students from the Yerevan Polytechnical Institute named for Karl Marx had gone into production training in the city. Their report continued:

However, there are shortcomings in the training of the first course students which have a negative effect on the quality of the training of specialists. Many of them are deprived of the right to work at their chosen specialty. Students of the Road Construction Faculty go for production training to various construction projects having little in common with road construction. There are 145 students working on construction sites, the majority are common laborers. At the Dzerzhinsky Plant students of the *vuzy* are doing their production training in a casting shop and do not have the opportunity to study molding . . . In a number of plants and projects, no serious attention is given to instruction in safety techniques. As a result there are many cases of production injuries. In many enterprises the transfer of students upon the completion of the apprentice period . . . is delayed without sufficient reason . . .

Lebedev, chief of the Main Administration for Engineering and Technical *Vuzy*, published a report in *Vechernaya Moskva* on June 22, 1960, which stated in part:

... Foremen and brigade leaders treat students as temporary workers and do not create good conditions for them to study thoroughly both their own and associated trades . . . Because of our poor educational work, there are still some students who do not try to master their trades, who work haphazardly, merely putting in their time, and who come to work late. . . . The experience of the first semester has proved quite convincingly the flimsiness of the arguments of those Moscow *vuzy* which discarded their approved educational plans and chose an easier way, the so-called weekly schedule, an alternate week of study and a week of work. As a result the productive work of the students was cut in half. . . . There is still little time for independent activities. . . . For this reason the Ministry of Higher Education and Secondary Specialized Education, R. F. S. F. R., has given permission to introduce a 12-hour week of studies instead of a 16-hour week. . . .

A lead editorial in *Pravda*, April 14, 1960, again brought up shortages of schools and classrooms. In the whole Soviet Union the plan for school construction was only 89% fulfilled. Particularly bad were the situations in Azerbaidzhan, Turkmenistan, and Kirghizia. In the Russian Republic, dormitory construction lagged so badly that it was only about one-half fulfilled. Some of the new buildings were already in need of repairs. According to *Pravda*, schools were still being built according to the old specifications which completely neglected the requirements of the new labor polytechnical schools. Party and Soviet organizations were severely criticized for not giving sufficient attention to these very urgent problems.

Pravda, in 1960, announced two very important decrees affecting the *vuzy*. The first of these, announced on February 7, dealt with requirements for advanced academic degrees. Inasmuch as criticism of graduate work still persisted, these changes represent attempts to eliminate the worst abuses by raising the standards of graduate work. Previously an aspirant had to satisfy the questions of his official opponents at his defense and to receive favorable opinions of scientific research establishments as to the quantity and quality of his work. The new regulations made it mandatory for the aspirants and his *vuz* also to secure the opinion of a leading enterprise, "the production of which corresponds to the field of the dissertation," before the disserta-

tion would be declared acceptable. No longer could the defense of the dissertation take place at the aspirant's *vuz* or his place of employment. It had to be held at another *vuz* or scientific research establishment.

The new regulations provided that an advanced degree could be awarded on the basis of a scientist's previously published works or for inventions that had been received favorably. The last regulation was issued after there had been specific criticism of the manner and practices of awarding advanced degrees given at the 21st Party Congress by M. A. Lavrentiev, a vice-President of the Academy of Sciences and President of its Siberian Department.

It was also ordered that dissertations in liberal arts and the social sciences must "primarily emphasize the experience of the Party and the people in the struggle for Communism and creatively elaborate basic problems of the times and fundamental developmental patterns of the transformation of socialism to communism." It was directed that the quality of dissertations in pedagogical sciences be vastly improved.

Councils of the *vuzy* and of scientific research institutes were empowered to deprive a person of his conferred degree if it were established that the degree was conferred mistakenly. A teacher could lose his degree if it were determined that the quality of his performance was poor. If, over a long period of time, a scientific worker had not produced any significant research, he might have his degree taken away from him by these councils.

The second series of directives to the *vuzy* were published on April 6, 1960. These dealt with admissions policy. First places must be given on a non-competitive basis to students with good grades who are sent to the *vuzy* by industries, construction projects, *soukhozy*, and *kolkhozy*. After all eligible in the first category are accepted, the *vuzy* must then admit academically qualified workers who have had at least two years of work experience.

A special problem created by recent demobilization of large numbers from the Soviet armed forces was dealt with. Officers seemed to be favored by these regulations. *Vuzy* are ordered to organize preliminary training to prepare these officers, who are to receive free education and stipends, for higher education.

An examination of materials published on education in the Soviet Union seems to indicate that Khrushchev and his associates have serious troubles in their educational system. The Soviet leaders have said, some of them quite frankly, that their much-vaunted system of education has simply not kept pace with the times. The number of students seeking higher education is much greater than the number of places available for them. School construction is lagging terribly. Only a minority of Soviet students have ever been able to go to decent schools. A much smaller minority have been able to enter the *vuzy*. Given the chronic labor shortage which has constantly confronted Soviet leaders and the overcrowding that they have been unable to cope with in their schools, the so-called Khrushchev reforms were not surprising.

It would be wrong for Americans to feel complacent about these facts. Anyone who takes time to go through a Soviet technical journal in chemistry or physics is bound to be impressed by the quantity and quality of work of the Soviet scientists. Americans should recognize, however, that their primary schools are better than any that exist in the Soviet Union. Americans should realize that the freedom to do research in such disciplines as history, sociology, economics, or political science does not exist in the Soviet Union. It is one thing to be able to create thermonuclear explosions and to struggle with the mysteries of plasma physics. It is another thing to be able to live with these discoveries after one has achieved them. American education, for all of its faults, is doing the job better than the system of our Soviet adversaries.

*The American Westerner in Russian Fiction**

By V. KIPARSKY

IT is an amazing fact that the American cowboy, who is probably the most familiar of all American characters to a West European picturegoer and comic-book reader, has never been well known in Russia. No Russian authors have introduced a cowboy into their works, even when they gave us realistic descriptions of the American West. One reason for this might be the fact that during the whole of the nineteenth century, the Russians' idea of America was molded by the works of Fenimore Cooper, Harriet Beecher-Stowe, and Mark Twain, which did not mention cowboys.

Until the very end of the nineteenth century there was no emigration from the purely Russian territories; only Poles, Jews, Lithuanians, and Finns emigrated from the hated Russian Empire. Russian peasants, when forced to move by famine or in search of more land and better conditions, went not to America, but to Siberia. Once more they proved that to a real Russian five thousand miles by cart or sledge seemed easier than even a short voyage by sea. The latter had to be paid for, the former cost only time, and a Russian had plenty of time. To the technical- and business-minded West European, America appeared as a country of freedom and equality, where the strong and capable were able to make a fortune even if they were of low origin. The Russians, for centuries kept in the hard conditions of a police state, had not yet developed the spirit of private enterprise. Even if some of them came to America,

*This is a chapter from the author's forthcoming book, *American and English Characters in Russian Fiction*. (Ed.)

they rarely succeeded there, because they did not come with the firm intention of making money and becoming exploiters.

Dostoevsky gives us an analysis of those first Russian emigrants in his weird novel *The Possessed* (1871).¹

Two characters, Shatov and Kirillov, had gone to America for a strange reason: "To test the life of the American workman on ourselves, and to verify by personal experiment the state of a man in the hardest social conditions." They hired themselves out as workmen to an employer who cheated them and even beat them. The Russians soon discovered that they were "like little children beside the Americans and that one must be born in America, or at least live for many years with Americans to be on a level with them." They used to pay a dollar for a thing worth a penny and did not even protest when an American fellow-worker slipped his hand in Shatov's pocket, took his brush, and began brushing his hair with it. They accepted everything: spiritualism, lynch-laws, revolvers, tramps. In a word, they behaved with much more naiveté than even Martin Chuzzlewit, and it is no wonder that when they returned to Russia (Nikolai Stavrogin released them by sending them a hundred rubles, just as Martin Chuzzlewit was released by the money sent to him by Mr. Bevan!) they felt that the laborer in Russia lived in a kind of paradise. Also, in the Epilogue to *The Brothers Karamazov* (1880), Dostoevsky shows us the disgust which a real Russian, Dimitri Karamazov, though victim of a Russian court's judicial error, was feeling towards the possibility of escaping to America: "I hate that America, damn it, already! And though they may be wonderful at machinery, every one of them, damn them, they are not of my soul . . . I shall choke there!" But even Dostoevsky was under the influence of Fenimore Cooper's stories, and his hero Dimitri continues: "As soon as I arrive there . . . we will set to work at once on the land, in solitude, somewhere very re-

¹Part I, Chapter IV.

mote, with wild bears. There must be some remote parts even there. I am told there are still Redskins there, somewhere, on the edge of the horizon. So to the country of the Last of the Mohicans, and there we'll tackle the grammar at once . . . Work and grammar—that's how we'll spend three years. And by that time we shall speak English like any Englishman. And as soon as we've learnt it—goodbye to America! We'll run here to Russia as American citizens."

Dostoevsky himself had never been to America and his thoroughly negative impression of Americans as "exploiters" must be a second-hand one. So also must be his "lynch-laws revolvers, tramps."

The first realistic fictional description of America by a Russian eye-witness appears, as far as I know, in the works of Grigory Machtet, a South Russian of allegedly Swedish origin.² In 1872, as a youth of nineteen, Machtet went to the States and spent two years in Kansas as a lumberjack. He did not make a fortune, but his stories of American life which he began to publish on his return made him quite well known in Russia during the last years of the century.³ Most of his heroes are real "Western Guys." They knew nothing of philosophy and politics. A worker in Paris, says Machtet, knows much more about social conditions than an average American. However, the American worker is not an inferior being, but politically

²According to a certain tradition, Machtet's ancestor, probably his great-great-grandfather, had served in the Swedish Army during the Great Northern War, but was originally a British officer. This first Machtet was taken prisoner by the Russians at Poltava in 1709 and never returned.

³Machtet began to publish his stories in different periodicals soon after his return, in 1874. Later on they were collected, together with other stories about Russia, and published in several volumes. The "American" stories are the following: "Iz amerikanskoi zhizni," "Pre-riya i pionery," "Gorozhane prerii," "V shkole," "Spirity i dukhi," "S emigrantami," "Obshchina Freya," "Pered Amerikanskim sudom," "Tserkovnyi miting," "Iz putevykh zapisok russkogo pereselentsa v Ameriku," "Strekoza," "Dva mira," "Chornaya neblagodarnost."

equal to his employer. Even a simple craftsman may become a colonel in the American Army. Newcomers are ruthlessly exploited, but even their salaries are high, compared with industries in Europe—not less than a dollar a day. In order to get a high salary the worker must be able to toil hard, and therefore the employer checks his muscles before hiring him, just as when buying a horse. This shocks a European, but is all right in America, where practically everything, including the human body is for sale. The "Western lad" (*molodets zapada*) is rude and cruel, but just. Even the much-scorned lynching is not unjust, according to Machtet, because the prisoner is generally given a fair trial and, having been sentenced, usually pleads guilty. Sometimes, however, torture is used. A young man, suspected of murdering a whole family, is hanged by the neck until he loses consciousness, revived and hanged again in order to extort a confession. Meanwhile, his innocence is proved. He is released and the same man who was actually putting the noose around his neck helps him to catch up with his work, neglected during the inquiry!⁴

Machtet discovered in the cool, hard "industrial Yankee" a human soul. One of the emigrants accidentally caused the death of an American. The trial is led by the sheriff, "a tall, bearded Yankee, a real 'Western Guy,' in shirt-sleeves and a leather apron, a harness-maker who just left his workshop." Everybody is helping to establish the truth. The prisoner is acquitted and now "hundreds of eyes were radiant with human feeling. Only now we understood how much deep humanity, how much delicacy, not superficial hypocritical politeness, but just delicacy, simple human friendliness is hidden under the icy, hard utterance of the 'industrial Yankee'." Machtet also discovered that the Westerner was not only energetic and courageous, but even proud. "They have simple, almost bad man-

⁴Compare this with the sentimental realism of Bret Harte's Western stories!

ners. They never leave their revolvers at home, but they never allow anybody to offend their honor." This was something unknown among the Russian lower classes, and if Machtet had been a better writer he might have been able to introduce a new idea about the American of the Middle West. As his stories were soon forgotten, his discovery of "the soul in the soulless Yankee" was not duly appreciated.

About thirty years later, Tan (more known as anthropologist under his real name Bogoraz) saw the Westerner in a quite different light: no more lynchings, tramps, and revolvers. The American West was consolidated and the inhabitants had become wealthy and peaceful. In the novel *Za okeanom* (*Beyond the Ocean*, 1902) Tan compares the West American farmers with Siberian peasants (*chaldony*): "... both are well-fed, red-faced, both eat meat three times a day, drink beer and cider." The Americans can all read and write, but what they read, resembles the newspapers which are read by Russian *okhotnoryadtsy* (butcher-boys) who are considered the worst obscurantists and reactionaries in the whole Empire. Americans of the Far and Middle West have, according to Tan, "butcher-boy's ideals, butcher-boy's papers, and butcher-boy's culture." Tan's dislike of America also was fed by his strongly leftist political opinions. At the same time, however, the average schoolboy in Russia, unaffected by politics, saw America in the different, romantic light of the "Western" story: "Oh, Lake Ontario, California, Texas, where the horrible lynching is so usual! Oh, Rocky Mountains, the wild home of the grizzly bear! Oh, prairie bandits . . . how charming you are, how beautiful!"—exclaims L. Medvedev, writing of his schooldays in the novel *V gimnazii* (*At School*, 1904).

Twenty years later, during the NEP-period, when the Soviet government was getting rid of its inner and outer enemies and beginning to develop the country in order to "catch up and to beat America," a brilliant Russian poet, Sergei Esenin, had a

personal experience with America. He married, in 1922, the famous American dancer Isadora Duncan, who was then touring Russia, and accompanied her to Western Europe and to America. Esenin's fame in Russia was then at its summit, but in New York he was not greeted as "the best Russian poet" (he himself was of that opinion and even boasted of it in one of his poems), but only as "the husband of the famous dancer." Nothing could have more offended Esenin than having to play the part of "prince consort." Not unlike his predecessors, Korolenko and Gorky, he began to hate "the unpoetical country" and his poetical answer was the creation of a Middle West American, a "simple dirty tramp from Indiana," in the great unfinished ballad "Strana negodyaev" ("The Land of the Scoundrels," 1922-1923). The tramp, called Mr. Jim, is sleeping on the floor of a cheap lodging-house, along with a Russian émigré "without whiskey and girls" and feels a strong desire "to eat good food and to wear a good suit." But he does not want "to spend the juice of his life." He knows an easier way: to take a gun, to load it with grains of gold and to shoot these grains into the side of a hill. Then, you have to hire a reporter, who makes a good story about a new Eldorado. You claim your hill for yourself and you will soon make money. The essential is to get a banker who will give you the start, the gold grains. "But, the tramp adds, you must know that there is no real gold in America . . . Your Siberia is much richer than the yellow California. There is no place for dreams in America—everybody, from Jew to Chinese, is only a businessman. If you begin to speak about soul, people will think that you are drunk or crazy. Here they are—the scoundrels of the whole world!"⁵

This was, however, a very romantic picture, even if Esenin wanted to destroy the "American romance." The first Russian to realize fully what others had only vaguely felt—that the

⁵The story is told in the poem by an old Bolshevik, Rassvetov, who has been, in his youth, to America.

frontier spirit of the Americans was dead—was Esenin's contemporary and rival, Vladimir Mayakovsky, who visited America twice, in 1925 and in 1928. After his first visit Mayakovsky gave a clear picture of his disappointment in the poem "100%" (1925). Before going to America he imagined a typical American to be an energetic, cheerful fellow, who says "all right" to any difficult situation, even if he loses a fortune or is wounded in a fight, who moves freely from one ocean to another, making money, having a good time and exciting adventures. "But I realized," Mayakovsky says, "that even I, a dissipated bohemian poet, was much more like this American fellow, than the real American of to-day: there are no such 'guys' in New York. Mister John, his wife and his cat, have become lazy and fat; they are all asleep in their little burrows."

A decade later this new idea about the modern America was developed by Boris Pilnyak in his interesting book *O. K.* (1935). Though described by the author himself as an "American novel," this book was really not a novel at all, but rather a semifictional account, of facts, impressions, and inventions. For the first time in Russian literature a description of an American cowboy is given, with the addition of a substantially true statement that the cowboy is rapidly becoming something like a variety actor. Although the book, on the whole, was a one-sided and biased denunciation of capitalist America, which "was built by hands that were far from clean, and never in white gloves," it was never used later in the anti-American campaign of the late forties. The reason is quite obvious: Pilnyak disappeared in 1938 and his works disappeared as if they had been put into the Orwellian memory hole. Later writers had to depend on earlier descriptions of America, even if they were much less up-to-date than the picture given by Pilnyak. Not even during the "thaw" of 1955-58 when several writers of the 'twenties and 'thirties were rehabilitated and reprinted (Babel, Yasensky,

Bulgakov, Shkvarkin) could I discover quotations from Pilnyak's works.

The famous *One-Storyed America*, also a semifictitious account, published in 1937 by Ilya Ilf and Evgeny Petrov after a trip made by them in a car thorough the U. S. A., is, on the contrary, still well known in the Soviet Union. But the authors avoided all comments on the romantic "Western Brave Men."

Some months before Stalin's death, when the anti-American campaign was at its summit in Soviet Russia, P. A. Sychoy produced a novel *U tikhogo okeana* (*At the Pacific Ocean*, 1952), in which he seems to repeat some of Machtet's statements. He gives them in the form of a letter, written by one Anton Grakhov, a Russian revolutionary who escaped to San Francisco after the abortive revolution of 1905. Sychoy carefully selected the most unpleasant facts from Machtet's stories: the boss who checks the muscles before hiring the worker; the workers who were kept in complete ignorance of social conditions and do not understand the "mechanism" of exploitation. But he fails to mention "the soul of the Yankee." On the contrary, Sychoy wrote that "there are no higher ideas in an American head, it can think only about technique and business."

A year later an interesting attempt was made by another writer, Alexander Kazantsev, in a science-fiction novel *Mol Severnyi* (*The Breakwater "North"*, 1953). Kazantsev describes a red-haired boy, Michael Nixon, of Baltimore. Brought up on horror-comics and Western films, he escapes from home and goes, as a stowaway, to the Far West. But the romance is gone even there—no Indians, no revolvers, no bandits . . . Still as a stowaway, Michael boards a ship bound for Vladivostok. Friendly stokers hide him in their cabin. In Vladivostok he jumps overboard, swims ashore, and travels through Siberia as a deaf-mute to avoid discovery. In Moscow, Michael is finally looked after by Soviet youth leaders, and here, at last, he finds the "true constructive romance" of our days—the building of giant

dams, breakwaters, and other projects, where his American energy can be used constructively. The idea, of course, is that the "run to America" belongs definitely to the past. Now Americans are beginning "a run to Soviet Russia." The "Western Fellow" has become Soviet-minded. The tide is turning . . . It must be noted that the whole effect of that story is lost by the author's sudden confession that the boy invented the story in order to please his Soviet comrades; in reality, he had been left in Russia by his father, an American journalist, who was recalled to the United States, because of his "peace work."

There seem to be no fictional pictures of America since the beginning of the "thaw" in Soviet literature. Journalistic reports are, of course, numerous, the most famous of them being the book about Khrushchev's tour of America in 1959. Quite naturally they have a heavy impact upon the ideas of the average Russian. And they avoid any mention of the romantic West, or the cowboys. Therefore, we have to expect that the modern Russian's idea of them is much nearer to present reality than the ideas which still nourish European schoolboys.

Lev Tikhomirov and a Crisis in Russian Radicalism

By KYRIL TIDMARSH

LESS than a decade before the October Revolution, Gershenzon wrote that the history of Russian political thought "is divided not into stages of internal development, but into periods of the preponderance of one or another foreign doctrine: Schellingianism, Fourierism, Positivism, Marxism, Nietzscheanism, Neo-Kantism . . . and therefore there is no semblance of a national evolution of thought."¹ The educated and sophisticated intelligentsia was, he believed, not only out of touch with but different in kind from the primitive people around it. "We are for the people," he continued, "not mere plunderers like the village *kulak*, who is one of their kind; we are for them not just foreigners, like the Turk or the Frenchman; the people see in us our particular Russian aspect but do not see in us a human soul—and for that reason they hate us passionately, with a subconscious, mystical terror all the more profound because we are of their own race."²

Sixty years earlier, Herzen had already discerned this when he wrote that "the trouble is that thought always runs far ahead and the people are unable to keep up with the theoreticians. Take our own time—some talk of revolution, which neither they nor the people are able to bring about. The *avant garde* thought that all one had to do was to say 'leave your hearth and follow me'—and all would start moving. They were wrong. The people knew the leaders as little as the leaders knew the people

¹M. O. Gershenzon, *Vekhi*, Moscow, 1910, p. 61.

²*Ibid.*, pp. 88-89.

and they were not believed. But, not noticing that there was no one behind them, these people tried to lead and to move forward. All of a sudden, they came to their senses and began to shout at those who lagged behind; they began to beckon and to call but it was too late, too far, their voice was not strong enough and they spoke a different language to the masses."³

The intelligentsia's preoccupation with nationality and *narodnost*, its interest in the *narodnik* movement itself, indicated not any "un-Russianness" of the intelligentsia—which was just as much a convenient term of abuse as "un-Americanism" is today—but a growingly disturbing realization that they were quite as much out of touch with the nonpolitical people as was the official bureaucracy. The painful idea was gradually gaining ground that, while attacking the German- and French-speaking bureaucracy for being alien and out of contact with the tragic realities of the Russian peasants' life, the intelligentsia, radical by definition, with its imported ideology, its political extremism, its faith in a clean start and breach from tradition, deserved the same criticism. When, in the early 1860s, hopes of reform from above were crushed and the radicals turned in desperation towards a terrorism which seemed to lead only to anarchy and destruction, these doubts came to a head.⁴

Tikhomirov's career is a search, both in the revolutionary

³A. Herzen, "S tovo berega" in *Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii*, ed. Lamke, Vol. V, p. 397.

⁴Kropotkin recalls how in 1863, soon after the fires broke out in the Apraksin market he visited his brother-in-law, a cavalry officer, at his barracks. "My brother-in-law had, until then, been a most conscientious reader of *Souremennik*. He now brought me several copies of the magazine and put them on the table saying, 'After all this, I do not want, henceforth, to have anything more to do with inflammatory writings. Enough.' These words," continues Kropotkin, "reflected the opinion of all St. Petersburg. It became indecent to talk of reforms. The atmosphere was filled with the smell of reaction." (P. A. Kropotkin, *Zapiski Revolyutsionera*, ed. Nedra, 1925, p. 131.) Avdotia Panaeva records in her *Vospominaniya* that when Turgenev returned to St. Petersburg soon after the conflagration in the Apraksin market, he was told, "Look what your nihilists have done."

movement and in the monarchy, for what he himself called "those firm foundations" (*osnovy*) which would provide a solution for the chronic Russian division between the leadership—whether Tsarist bureaucracy or the radicals—and society. Both as member of the Executive Committee of *Narodnaya Volya* and later, as adviser to the Tsar, Tikhomirov always thirsted for the same positive, orderly, and, above all, constructive activity: "Organization—that is everything, the cornerstone of social existence, he repeated with more and more conviction."⁵ When he became convinced that the negation which the intelligentsia expressed in revolutionary theories and in terrorism could not create a positive foundation for the building of a socially integrated state, he turned to that monarchy which already existed to help achieve this end. Both as terrorist and as monarchist, he feared a very similar ossification in each camp—on the one hand dogma and on the other bureaucracy—and sought in these radically opposed political extremes for the same 'zhiznennost'—by which he meant proximity to life and freedom from any codification or superimposed theory.

Tikhomirov perceived that, deprived for generations of effective contact with the shaping of policy, the intelligentsia became increasingly out of touch with political realities, with its thought becoming ever more theoretical, impractical, and idealistic.⁶ The

⁵N. S. Rusanov, *V Emigratsii*, Izdatelstvo Politkatorzhan, Moscow, 1929, per D. Kuzmin, *Narodovolskaya Zhurnalistsika*, Moscow, 1930.

⁶This characteristic had likewise been observed by some left-wing thinkers who however saw in this only a further reason for a more resolute turn to the Left. In 1858, for instance, Chernyshevsky wrote an allegorical story called *Russky Chelovek na Rendezvous* in which he too castigated the intelligentsia for doing a great deal of talking but shrinking from any positive—for him socialist and revolutionary—action. "Our hero is in good form," he writes, "so long as there is no thought of action and so long as there is need only to use up spare time and occupy one's idle head and equally indolent time with dreams and gossip; but when the time comes to express one's thoughts and desires directly and to the point, then the majority of our heroes begin to waver and to stutter . . ." (N. G. Chernyshevsky, *Izbrannye Sochineniya*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1950, p. 737).

realization was coming to a small group of Russian thinkers like Tikhomirov that this political inexperience of the intelligentsia had led to its falling victim, blindly and uncritically, to the cult of revolution, whose stereotyped ideology was in any case not fully Russian.⁷ Gradually, it came to be realized that in protesting against the rigid official dogma of the regime and its censorship, the radicals had themselves created an intellectual despotism and a censorship — directed against all those who did not wish to pay tribute to the gods of revolution — which was almost as effective as that of the government.⁸

Tikhomirov noted this subordination to theory in both camps. Thus, as a revolutionary, when he was editor of *Vestnik Narodnoi Voli* and member of the party's central committee, he wrote: "... the influence of the reactionary spirit is nowhere so sadly in evidence as in the conflict of the live revolutionary idea against the doctrine which seizes hold of it ... when the spiders of doctrine begin their work, the live spirit of the movement is laced up in a steel corset of unalterable and conceited formula. Constant interconnection with life, responsiveness and the capacity for adaption are stifled and with them disappears the capacity of the idea to act upon society."⁹ In the same way, in 1897, when he had swung to the other extreme and was already adviser to the Tsar, the motives for his objection to the bureaucracy were not very different. "The pernicious influence of the bureaucracy," he writes, "lies in the fact that it

⁷It is ironical that this applied equally to the thought of Slavophiles whose teaching was itself as deeply influenced by Western ideas as were many of the Westerners. See the work of N. Riasanovsky, *Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles*, 1952; also, Hans Kohn, *Panslavism, Its History and Ideology*, 1955, p. 109.

⁸Leskov wrote of the early '60s: "At that time everyone who for some reason did not share Red opinions, seemed to acquire the appellation of government spies ... thus began the rule of slanderous terror under liberal guise in place of a terror of quite another sort." (N. Leskov, *Polnoye Sobranie Sochinenii*, ed. Marks, Vol. 28, p. 67. Also see his "Journey with a Nihilist," Vol. 19, p. 12.)

⁹*Vestnik Narodnoi Voli*, No. 4, 1885, p. 234.

subordinates the whole existence of the nation to the same identical and compulsory norms, destroying, so far as the power of the government will permit, all free and creative work of the nation as independent centres of life."¹⁰ Both as revolutionary and as monarchist his ideal was basically the same—a firm, powerful and independent Russia built upon the ideals of indigenous tradition, stability, and justice. When he was a revolutionary already, one feels that subconsciously he directed his activity to the creation of a state governed by a benevolent dictatorship ruling in the interests of all. Therefore, as long as he saw a weakening of *samoderzhavie*, stagnation, venality, and incompetence in that form of government and, above all, so long as he saw only weakness in government circles, he stood wholeheartedly for revolutionary theories in the hope of an overthrow of the existing state and the creation of a strong administration in accordance with all his convictions about a concentrated central authority which would enjoy the confidence of the whole community.¹¹

As a revolutionary, Tikhomirov had no faith in the government and adhered to the radicals because "from the first moments of the new reign there was evidence of a complete ab-

¹⁰L. Tikhomirov, *Edinolichnaya vlast kak printsip gosudarstvennosti*, New York, 1923, p. 93.

¹¹It is interesting to see how an extreme version of these two ideas—the need for authority and the contempt for excessive theory—became embodied in modern Fascism. "In democratic life authority has become more and more impersonal. One has constantly less and less to do with human beings and more and more to do with offices, rubber stamps, telephones and typewriters. Fascism restores authority, puts every man in his place, eliminates harmful social elements and re-establishes order and true liberty. In a more literal sense Fascism frees the country from the influence of inferior races and ideologies imported from abroad and thus restores the profound unity of the people, the intimate harmony between the individual and the community." (I. Silone, *School for Dictators*, p. 268.) Goebbels wrote in *Wesen und Gestalt des Nationalsozialismus* that "we had no intention of basing our views on a scientific foundation. Our object was to put them into practice. Posterity will recognize our ideas from our deeds and not the reverse."

sence of moral connection between government and the governed. The government was almost hanging in the air . . ."¹² The reason for his belief in the revolutionary movement at that time can be seen in his statement that "the revolutionary party was seen by society as a fateful and all-powerful force."¹³ It was this which was the primary motive for his defection from the party: "I was finally convinced," he wrote, "that Russian revolution does not exist as a living and a conscious power . . . to my eyes, it has become clear that henceforth one must expect everything from Russia while expecting nothing from the revolutionaries."^{14, 15}

The political writings of Tikhomirov and his personal life are closely intertwined and in both there can be seen the same search for "*pochva*" — foundations — which made him a member of the Central Committee of *Narodnaya Volya* and was also eventually the motive for one of the most important works on Russian monarchist theory, written by him as editor of the right-wing *Moskovskie Vedomosti*.

Tikhomirov's father was a Caucasian army doctor, but, like so many revolutionaries, he stemmed from a clerical family of long standing and there can be no doubt that this clerical background and its traditions played a large part in his development. Tikhomirov was born in 1852 in one of the frontier castles on the eastern shores of the Black Sea in the kind of

¹²*Vestnik Narodnoi Voli*, No. 1, p. 29.

¹³*Ibid.*

¹⁴L. Tikhomirov, *Pochemu ya perestal byt revolyutsionerom*, Paris, 1888, pp. 9-10.

¹⁵A very similar parallel in England is the career of William Joyce, "Lord Haw-Haw," "who had been brought up to believe in an England who held Ireland by force and felt betrayed when Home Rule was given." The Joyce family were people who "honestly loved law and order and preferred the smart uniforms and the soldierly bearing of the English garrisons and the Royal Irish Constabulary to the furtive slouching of a peasantry distracted with poverty and revolutionary fever." Rebecca West, *The Meaning of Treason*. London, 1949, p. 20 and p. 17.

besieged and defensive atmosphere in which it was dangerous to go beyond the walls of the fortification without an armed guard. Here, between the mountains and the sea, he grew, a weak precocious child adored by his deeply religious parents. Finishing the Alexandrov Gymnasium at Kazan, he entered Moscow University in 1870 and very soon became a member of the Chaikovsky circle. Skeptical, always considering the general principle rather than becoming emotionally incensed at particular injustices, with his fundamental but controlled idealism and obstinate character, he was peculiarly well-suited to the revolutionary role. In 1873 he was arrested in the "case of the 193" and, without undergoing trial, spent the next five years in custody at the Peter and Paul fortress. It was here, according to his memoirs, that he was turned into a wholehearted and convinced revolutionary. Soon after release, in 1878, he was placed under police surveillance. This decided him to go underground with a false passport in the name of Aleshenko. Henceforth, he played a leading role in *Narodnaya Volya*, and, incidentally, was for some time, until his marriage to another revolutionary by the name of Sergeeva, engaged to the famous terrorist Sofia Perovskaya.

Tikhomirov was always the theoretician of the party: he did not participate actively in the assassination of the Tsar in 1881, although he had been present at the Lipetsk Conference during the previous year, where the decision to do so was taken. It is nevertheless interesting to hear Tikhomirov's argument against terrorism in which one can discern the same *motifs* of efficiency and political efficaciousness. "Either one or the other. Either you have enough strength to overthrow the government and alter the regime which resists change, or you have not. In the first case, there is no need for political assassination and in the second case, the assassination will have no purpose."¹⁶ It was,

¹⁶Quoted by P. Lavrov in *Evolyutsiya ili revolyutsiya?*

however, Tikhomirov who, after the explosion, drafted the proclamation to the new Tsar.

During the period of intensive persecution by the police of *Narodnaya Volya*, in the months after March 1, Tikhomirov and his wife and children had to keep moving, seeking refuge in Moscow, Kazan, and Rostov-on-Don. The organization of *Narodnaya Volya* was shaken and the conviction was growing among those revolutionaries who remained, that their defeat was imminent. "We revolutionaries," wrote Tikhomirov, "seemed totally shattered and apparently had no place in Russian life. Why were we broken? Clearly, we are not suitable, for some reason, we are not doing what is right. It was obvious that we could not accomplish anything with those misfits, those puerile and limited personalities who were on our side."¹⁷

Here once again Tikhomirov touched upon a consideration which preoccupied others at that time who came to have doubts about the development of radicalism in Russia. This was that the revolutionary movement did not possess the right kind of followers to implement a given policy.¹⁸ As the practical Leskov—who was himself called "a reactionary" by the radicals for observing this—said, "A single Don Quixote can put a whole philosophy of knight errantry to ridicule."¹⁹ It seemed impossible for Russia to escape from these Don Quixotes: it was either a useless or else an unscrupulous revolutionary who be-

¹⁷Maevsky, *Revolutsioner-Monarkhist*, Belgrade, 1934, p. 35.

¹⁸When Nezhdanov, Turgenev's pathetic caricature of a *narodnik*, in *Virgin Soil*, in his pseudo-peasant garb, tries to preach the radical lesson to the people, he is cut short: "Don't spin it out, *barin*, but tell me straight: will you or won't you give me the land as it is?" is the direct retort of a peasant to Nezhdanov's propaganda. "Good heavens," replies Nezhdanov, "what sort of a *barin* am I?" "Well," is the *mujik's* answer, "if you are an ordinary mortal, what's the use of you—there's a good man, leave me alone." Nezhdanov's only comment to himself about the revolutionary ideas he was propagating was quite simple: "God, what nonsense," and again, "it's all not worth a farthing." (I. Turgenev, *Complete Works*, St. Petersburg, 1891, Vol. IV, pp. 254, 271, and 253.)

¹⁹N. Leskov, *Complete Works*, ed. Marks, Vol. VIII, p. 136.

came a familiar figure in Russian literature. This was no longer the seeker, the "iskatel" of the 1840s or the bearer of a new gospel—it was more often, in the literature of the 'seventies, a parasitic obstacle to the realization of these ideas. The generation of the Rudins, about whom the intelligentsia had indulged in so much soul-searching, had not been eradicated by the subsequent generation of the so-called "children"—the utilitarian Bazarovs of the 1860s. They had merely been replaced by others of a less attractive character. As Turgenev himself saw at the end of his life, what had happened was that the true romantics had been replaced by new "romantics of realism." These men, such as Nezhdanov in *Virgin Soil*, "yearn for the realistic and strive towards it, just as the former romantics did towards their ideal . . ." ²⁰ It came to be seen, furthermore, how closely the criminal bordered on the revolutionary ²¹ and how much of the social disorder was stirred up out of self-interest by the unscrupulous hangers-on of revolution. As Pisemsky put it, "a positive premonition told me that the talk, noise and clatter all about us is no storm but only bubbles and froth partly inflated from without and partly created by the filth rising from below us." ²²

Tikhomirov was particularly sensitive to such a realization of the weaknesses of the revolutionary forces. This is the beginning of the long period of doubt and reappraisal of his political ideas which culminated with the letter he wrote to the Tsar confessing and seeking forgiveness for his past activities. The final breach was still, however, six years ahead. In 1882, broken and exhausted, Tikhomirov left Russia for Geneva and then Paris.

²⁰From an unpublished notebook of Turgenev, quoted by André Mazon, "L'élaboration d'un roman de Tourguenev: *Terres Vierges*" in *Revue d'Etudes Slaves*, 1925, 1 and 2, p. 87.

²¹The Nechaev case took place at this time. The problem which is posed of the nexus between revolution and the lunatic fringe found a most influential expression in Dostoevsky's *The Devils*.

²²A. Pisemsky, *Sochineniya*, Vol. IV, p. 548.

In Geneva he became editor of *Vestnik Narodnoi Voli*, contributing a large number of the articles himself for, as an Italian historian put it, "Tikhomirov was the best spokesman among his companions, the one who could best express in politically comprehensive form the essence and the consequence of the force which inspired them all."²³ Nevertheless, the seed of defection had been sown—the political problem with which he was faced, kept him plunged in a constant state of mental anguish. He could not escape the doubts which preyed on his mind: "There is nowhere," he wrote about the struggle of the old and new, revolution against reaction, "where one can take shelter from this conflict and anxiety. A kind of apocalyptic and majestic disquiet takes hold of your soul when you try to cast your eyes over the boundless depth, breadth and all-embracing nature of this great conflict. You cannot timidly withdraw into a quiet harbor even if you wish; for it exists neither in honest labor, nor in the family, nor in the academic's study. The conflict follows you on its own accord, catches up with you and forces you to take up your position on one side or on the other."²⁴ Slowly he began to feel the grip upon him of those ideas of reaction which plagued him like microbes. "What is to be done," he asks, "when you know that countless, all-pervading clouds of atavistic embryos are making use of every minute of your rest to come alive, develop and grow roots. What is to be done when you feel these seeds in yourself, when you feel that like microbes and bacteria, they make use of every moment of your weakness to seize hold of you. Not only is revolution fighting, but reaction is also. Our energy and our resistance are weakening and the enemy makes use of it to deliver the final blow."²⁵ This was not far off. He wrote of the period 1878-1881: "... remaining theoretically a radical socialist and

²³F. Venturi, *Il Popolismo Russo*, 1952, Vol. 2, p. 1040.

²⁴*Vestnik Narodnoi Voli*, 1885, No. 4, pp. 227-228.

²⁵*Op. cit. Ibid.*

a revolutionary, I suffered emotionally during those years, in my inner store of impressions, a wonderful change which cut absolutely across my previous theoretical convictions."²⁶

The discovery, in 1884 that Degaev, one of the leading members of the party, was a police spy²⁷ gave the *coup de grace* to any ideas which Tikhomirov had had about the possibility of strong and effective rule coming from a revolutionary committee. Formerly "the government had feared the Committee (of *Narodnaya Volya*) and was therefore prepared to make concessions. After the defection of Degaev, however, its eyes were opened and it realized at the brink of what a colossal bluff it had found itself."²⁸

Psychologically, this discovery was a severe blow for Tikhomirov. As a *Narodovolets* he had found justification for his political faith in the moral degradation into which Tsarism had been dragged by its unscrupulous secret police. Tikhomirov had himself lived for long enough in the political penumbra of terrorist plot and police provocation to be repelled by this kind of secret warfare. An important factor confirming his belief in the need to overthrow Tsarism had been not only its

²⁶L. Tikhomirov, *Vospominaniya*, p. 82.

²⁷Sergei Degaev, a member of *Narodnaya Volya*, had been arrested in 1882 following an abortive attempt to assassinate Colonel Sudeikin, the Director of the Secret Service. After an interrogation conducted by Sudeikin himself, Degaev agreed to work for the Third Division. In the course of 1883 he betrayed several revolutionaries including Vera Figner. When, in 1884, suspicions were aroused against him, he arranged for Sudeikin to send him on mission to Paris. Here he came straight to Tikhomirov and confessed what he had done. Faced with Dagaev's confession Tikhomirov persuaded him to expiate his sin by going back to Russia and murdering Sudeikin. Surprisingly enough Degaev fulfilled his mission and Sudeikin met a particularly unsavory death. After the murder Degaev managed to escape to Latin America together with his wife who had been held hostage in London during Degaev's last mission. Degaev had a curious family background, his mother and sisters having a morbid fascination for the exciting, the mysterious, and the underhand. Sergei lived up to their interests.

²⁸*Krasnyi Arkhiv*, Vol. 26-27, p. 172.

weakness but also the depravity of its servants, such as Colonel Sudeikin who specialized in organizing provocation and bribery. It was, in Tikhomirov's words, "*mir merzosti i zapusteniya*." "Amidst the rumble of exploding dynamite, the autocracy heard assurances of absolute devotion and offers of unconditional help only from the heterodox milieu of political savages and adventurers, parasitically sucking the people's lifeblood—and also from a few Slavophile cranks."²⁹ Support of the Tsarist regime came only from "the court clique of the aristocracy and the bureaucracy. Careerists, important "operators," like the young out of the nest of Katkov, or Slavophile traitors to their own cause such as Aksakov, here and there a cabal of *kulaks* and various exploiters, in short, a mixed bag of every kind of dross, flourishing and carrying through its petty deals, thanks to the system of licence, lawlessness, and general inarticulateness."³⁰ When he learned the extent of Degaev's treachery and the magnitude of his aspirations, it must have become clear to Tikhomirov that in this at least, the revolutionary milieu was not far different from that of the monarchy. It is, however, curious that while so much more concerned with general political principles than with particular events, Tikhomirov failed to consider the possibility that it was part of the very system of such over-centralized government to give rise to these self-perpetuating secret services. Tikhomirov described the plan of Sudeikin and Degaev to usurp the position of Plehve, the Minister of the Interior, but the consideration did not strike him that such plots may be a natural characteristic of total regimes.³¹

²⁹*Vestnik Narodnoi Voli*, 1883, No. 1, p. 42.

³⁰*Ibid.*

³¹For a discussion of this see Hannah Arendt, "*Burden of Our Time*," 1951, p. 403. Also Maurice Laporte, "*Histoire de l'Okhrana*," Paris, 1935, p. 23. It is said that the ultimate aim of Sudeikin and Degaev had been to remove the Tsar and run the country from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (See *Byloe*, April, 1906).

"The position of the party is without hope," he wrote, "there is no personnel and perhaps it would be more profitable to arrive at some kind of compromise with the government."³² There still remained for Tikhomirov a period of doubt before he was finally convinced that there was nothing concrete to be hoped for from the revolutionary movement. However, intellectually, the turning point had come with the discovery about Degaev.

Personal factors played an equally fundamental role in the motivation of Tikhomirov's defection. Here, too, there may be discerned the same search for *osnovy*, security, and stability. From the time of his marriage and the birth of his first child there can be seen in Tikhomirov a desire for a more settled and creative existence, and it was at this time that he tried, unsuccessfully, to leave the party. Most important was his love of his son. Putting financial motives aside, there was here again, as in his broader view of the Russian political scene, the same desire to find firm foundations for his son's education which he was unable to give him as an émigré. He suffered because he was unable to explain to little Alyosha why he was living away from Russia and described how painful it was for him to have to take the child to a Western church. He once wrote very revealingly about the resentment he felt at the flippant way in which émigré women played with his little boy, asking him if he too were a *Narodovolets*. This was another potent factor in his defection. The instability and looseness, both physical and intellectual, of the émigré circles he lived in, clashed with his orderly nature and, in his description, many years later, of meals eaten straight out of grocer's packing paper without bothering to unwrap it properly, one can sense a disgust with this kind of disorderly life which goes far deeper than these petty inconveniences. All this time, furthermore, he had to live on gifts from wealthier companions.

³²*Krasnyi Arkhiv*, Vol. 26-27, p. 168.

A personal crisis came when his son fell mortally ill with a particularly painful and prolonged form of meningitis. The doctors held out no hope and his hysterical wife protested against Lev's obstinate torture of the dying child with continued treatment, forcing its paralyzed jaws open to administer more and more drugs. At this stage, Tikhomirov rediscovered the power of prayer and, contrary to all expectations, the child recovered. This apparent miracle reawakened all the religious qualities latent in him since childhood and Orthodoxy began to have an increasing significance for him. The descriptions of his fears about visiting the Orthodox Church because it was attached to the Embassy, and his immense joy on finally deciding to take his son there, are clearly descriptions of a most important factor in his ultimate conversion. All this time, however, he continued writing without respite.

Throughout this period Tikhomirov was haunted by the idea of defection, against which he appeared subconsciously to be fighting a losing battle. In one of his articles he wrote: "We cannot comfort ourselves with the thought 'I will rest, have a deep sleep, and wake up fresh and energetic'. Unfortunately, we can be quite certain that waking up, we will see ourselves, like Gulliver, tied up in the Lilliputian cobweb on all sides—immobilized by a web which only a few hours ago we could have torn."³³ Later in the same article, he writes that "the idea of reaction converted even great revolutionaries to its cause."³⁴ This is precisely what happened. While the treason of Degaev was, intellectually, the final blow which convinced him that there was no longer any "stern, omnipotent power in revolution," the emotional climate in which the final conversion was accomplished was provided by a period of peace and tranquility during the convalescence of his son. The doctors insisted that it was imperative to remove the boy from Paris and Tikh-

³³*Vestnik Narodnoi Voli*, 1885, p. 228.

³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 232.

omirov spent some months of complete peace in a large empty house that he had rented at Le Raincy. This was indeed the "sleep" from which the revolutionary Tikhomirov awoke, bound by the Lilliputian bonds of monarchism. Walking in the bright sunlight with his wife and child through the water meadows near Le Raincy and pacing by night through the bare, creaking and resonant rooms of the old wooden house, he re-evaluated his whole political philosophy. "How many blissful hours did I spend on this meadow near the playing child, deep in the spiritual rest of solitude and my own thoughts . . . and I thought of much . . . there grew in me something new, whose significance I could not yet understand myself—from which I could not yet draw any deductions—but it was something powerful, the truth of which I felt with a certainty which allowed of no doubt."³⁵

In 1887 the Tsar accepted a petition for pardon from Tikhomirov. He immediately returned to Russia in the face of the most vociferous protests from the right-wing press—especially *Russkii Vestnik*,³⁶ and devoted the remainder of his life to prolific writing in the cause of monarchy. He became Editor of *Moskovskie Vedomosti* and was rewarded by the Tsar with a gift of a golden snuffbox. Under Stolypin he became a Counselor of State and member of the Council of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

There can be no question of Tikhomirov's sincerity. Unlike a Bulgarin, he acquired no reputation of having sold himself for money and he betrayed no one. He survived the Bolshevik Revolution to die almost a beggar in 1923. Maevsky suggests

³⁵L. Tikhomirov, *Vospominaniya*, p. 280.

³⁶This journal wrote in September 1888: "After perverting and subverting our student youth for fifteen years, this scoundrel now advises his former friends and convinced criminals that one should not subvert the young . . . in our opinion, the government should only invite him to the gallows." Quoted by V. Bogucharsky, *Iz istorii revolyutsionnoi borby 70h i 80h godov*, Moscow, 1912, p. 123.

that he was spared by the new rulers of Russia for his past services to revolution and also because he had not given away any of his colleagues. The Soviet critic Nevsky agrees: "Clearly, the motives are deeper (than self-interest); clearly, the reasons for such a phenomenon as the apostasy of a major figure in *Narodnaya Volya*, its theoretician, and the author of the party programme, lie in the general course of the affairs of the epoch itself, especially as in no sense can Tikhomirov be called either a provocateur, petty traitor or a man who altered his views for position or for gain."³⁷ Tikhomirov's defection was thus not occasioned by any low motives but should be seen as part of a far wider crisis which afflicted Russian radicalism. Always, as a revolutionary and as a monarchist, Tikhomirov saw the need for the construction of a positive theoretical basis for the party or the monarchy which held the reins of power and looked with contempt at the weakness, divorce from society, and instability of the opposing camp. In 1884, as a revolutionary, he wrote of the "reactionary camp": "You will see straight away that the whole movement is a matter of a small coterie which has seized hold of authority but which had not under itself any kind of *pochva*—foundation—no mass of people inspired by the same idea. Frightened, gauche, apathetic, and slavishly patient, our society considers its position despicable but nevertheless suffers it; it is repelled by it as much as it can be, it opposes it as far as its weakened strength will permit . . . but one cannot create anything without the help of great, actively co-operating masses . . . the apathy and the subjugation of society are useful and harmful only so long as you are destroying—but try to pass to creation and you will crash against this apathy . . . That is the consequence of the lack of foundation—*bezpochvennosti*—of reaction, a lack of foundation which, in its turn, is the result of its anti-social character, its fantastic, almost insane ideals, which are completely contradictory to the actual laws and require-

³⁷V. Nevsky, introduction to L. Tikhomirov, *Vospominaniya*, p. V.

ments of the social organism."³⁸ With his high moral principles, Tikhomirov was disgusted by an administration capable of using methods of terrorism and men such as Sudeikin in its police force . . . "What despair and anger seizes hold of you when you think in whose hands are the fortunes of our hundred million strong people . . ."³⁹ No one can save you and your government order. Destroying, crushing and rotting everything, it subverts itself. It carries death in its wake because it fears the mind, fears feeling, fears conscience and freedom—fears everything that composes the life of man and on which develops the life of society. And then it begins to turn into a lifeless and decaying corpse."⁴⁰ A few years later, his words about the revolutionaries were not very different. "The great Russian revolution," he wrote as a monarchist, "composed of a mixture of the most heterodox ideas gathered the world over and possessing not a spark of constructive, universalising thought, could not but reveal in its first application to reality, in the first moments of rule, its social, political and spiritual weakness. It declined into a rage of destructiveness which perplexed its more intelligent and honest supporters; the remainder of the population saw quite clearly that one could not live like that, that somehow one had to subdue this 'revolution' which internally brings social decay and externally destroys Russia as a whole."⁴¹

What Russia needed, he believed, was not a restoration, not a "reaction," "for that exists only because revolution has discredited itself. Let us not forget that revolution could have appeared only because the principles which are being resuscitated by reaction had compromised themselves earlier still."⁴² "What is thus wanted is in no sense a reaction but a renaissance of the lifegiving national historical foundations; it is necessary

³⁸*Vestnik Narodnoi Voli*, No. 3, 1884, pp. 148-149.

³⁹*Vestnik Narodnoi Voli*, No. 2, 1884, p. 103.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p. 124.

⁴¹L. Tikhomirov, *K reforme obnovennoi Rossii*, p. 36.

⁴²*Ibid.*, pp. 37-38.

for them to become in actual fact the same as they are in their theoretical content." Like the *Pochvenniki*, Tikhomirov wanted the same kind of synthesis of all previously contradictory, extremist and what they thought nebulously un-Russian ideas of the intelligentsia. There were elements vital for Russia both in "revolution" and in "reaction." He despised the extremism which led to the mutually exclusive polarization of Russian opinion. "Elements of 'reaction,'" he had written, "exist and act more or less tangibly even in the hands of the most typical exponents of revolution."⁴³ He wrote this while still a revolutionary émigré. As a monarchist his idea was not very different. "The basis of reasonable political development can be neither the principle of conservatism nor the principle of progress, nor the principle of revolution."⁴⁴ "A reasonable policy must be based only on the principle of evolution, that is, on the development of the strength of the nation out of its own content. In this process there is always a certain element of conservatism, a certain element of progress and, if there should take place a revolution—as a pure chance—it should never be with the purpose of the creation of anything which is not already, by means of evolution, contained in society." In his petition to the Tsar he had written: "I understood that the development of peoples, as of everything living, takes place only organically, on the basis on which they had been historically formulated and nurtured and that a healthy development can only be peaceful and national. I understood the falsity of ideas which destroy society by fostering ideas of limitless freedom and rights of the individual, both of which are only possible in an environment of powerful moral authority . . . I came to an understanding of the power and the honour of our historical traditions which reconciled spiritual freedom with an unques-

⁴³*Vestnik Narodnoi Voli*, 1885, No. IV, p. 226.

⁴⁴L. Tikhomirov, "*Monarkhicheskaya gosudarstvennost*," Part IV, p. 267.

tioned central authority, raised above all personal ambitions. I came to understand what a priceless treasure and irreplaceable weapon for its welfare is Higher Authority."⁴⁵ What Tikhomirov wanted was a benevolent sovereign, imbued with the spirit of Russian Orthodoxy, ruling liberally where possible but capable of bringing into action undisputed force wherever it was considered necessary.

It was psychologically a very similar tendency towards an avoidance of extremism which was soon to find expression in the so-called "Economists" and the "Legal Marxists." The economists revolted on behalf of the material interests of the working class rank-and-file against the doctrinaire influence of the ideologues of revolution. It was fear of the same extremism which was responsible for the spread in Russia of ideas like those of Bernstein.⁴⁶ A critical point in the development of Russian radicalism came with the discovery of the need for a replacement of ideas of social revolution by a social reformism and Tsarism by a liberal monarchy.

It is the tragedy of Russian liberalism that it was only through a reaction against the extremism of the radicals that it gained any supporters. The career of Lev Tikhomirov is an illustration of this.

⁴⁵L. Tikhomirov, *Vospominaniya*, p. 250.

⁴⁶E. D. Kuskova wrote in her *Credo*: "An intolerant Marxism, a negative Marxism, a primitive Marxism will give way to a democratic Marxism and the social position of the party in contemporary society must be categorically altered. The party will give recognition to society; its narrowly corporative, in a majority of cases partisan, purposes will expand into truly social ones and its striving for a seizure of authority will be transformed into striving for the alteration and the reform of contemporary society in a democratic direction, adjusted to the contemporary state of affairs." (V. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, 1930 ed., Vol. II, p. 478.)

Book Reviews

SETON-WATSON, HUGH. *Neither War Nor Peace: The Struggle for Power in the Postwar World*. New York, Praeger, 1960. 504 pp. \$7.50.

Like his distinguished father, Hugh Seton-Watson combines expertise in the history and politics of central and southeastern Europe with a broad knowledge of contemporary world affairs. This background, plus his study of Russia which has already found expression in two solid books on Russian history before and after 1917, eminently qualifies him to undertake a history and analysis of world affairs since the Second World War. Before trying to judge how well he has done it, one must recognize that the task itself is impossible. There are the obvious hazards for the historian in having too much evidence at hand (knowing at the same time that on many crucial points there is still not enough) and too little perspective. There is the difficulty of finding themes which tie together diplomatic exchanges, social forces, scientific advance, the "weapons revolution," ideology and all the other apparently disparate threads in the fabric of our contemporary world. There is, finally, the question for whom the book is written. For the college student, who needs a textbook with all the salient facts? For the general reader, who wants a comprehensible explanation of what has been happening and some help in defining his own attitudes

as a responsible citizen? Or for the expert, who is on the lookout for something new in the way of information and synthesis?

To the credit of Mr. Seton-Watson he has provided something for all three. He has faced up to the difficulties of his job with due modesty and then set about overcoming most of them. The result is a first-rate performance. If some parts have the air of a potboiler, they are more than counterbalanced by others of high quality. If the requirement of brevity seems sometimes to produce superficiality, more often it leads to real triumphs in the art of skillful and accurate summation of the most complex matters. If, despite the title, the author does not really attempt to write the history of the cold war, or touch more than lightly the military aspects or the long negotiations on Germany and on disarmament, he had to make a choice and chose to cover the world, ranging from poverty in India to the Negro problem in the United States. Following the maxim that "description and analysis are necessary to each other," he has chosen to present his thoughts in the form of a well-stuffed sandwich, with a narrative of events at top and bottom and a filling of interpretation in between. While the bread is not exactly stale, a reader may be pardoned if he concentrates on the richer fare of the analytical chapters, which discuss such topics as classes in modern society, totalitari-

anism, the seizure of power, the nature of Communist institutions, nationalism and imperialism, and the revolt of Asia and Africa.

Mr. Seton-Watson is so much the cautious scholar, surrounding his conclusions with qualifying words and rarely pushing out to the limits of his argument, that a reviewer is hard put to find material for controversy. But Mr. Seton-Watson is not afraid to express opinions, which he frankly admits are those of a representative of Western society; he seeks no artificial "objectivity" halfway between the Communist world and the West—or between the "new nations" and the West for that matter.

A few of those opinions relating to Russia and the Communist bloc will give some idea of the flavor and quality of the book. On the role of the peasantry in revolution he concludes that the three victorious Communist revolutions (Russian, Chinese, Yugoslav) depended in crucial stages on peasant support; but there, as in the revolutions occurring in the underdeveloped countries today, the peasants never control the revolution or the regime which follows it. On Soviet agriculture he says that the regime still faces the old dilemma: whether to have a docile peasantry or an efficient peasantry; efficiency will come only if material incentives are much greater than those offered by the reforms of 1953-58. On the subject of possible change in Russia he mentions the pressure for reform by the "state bourgeoisie," the industrial managers and others who have wealth, prestige and executive power, but do not hold political power; at present the Communist party is in undisputed

control and may be for a long time, but "one may perhaps suggest that the more the present leaders of the Soviet Union succeed in thwarting the pressure for reform, the better will be the chances of revolutionary pressure against their successors."

The author has sprinkled his text with historical allusions and comparisons which add interest, depth and perspective. And it is gratifying that in this world of super-weapons and the titanic struggle of super-powers he always comes back to the nature of man and to the recurring patterns of political behavior. If he seems to draw over-heavily on his experience in Balkan history and politics, it is because of his frankly stated and well-founded view that the Balkans' "combination of intellectual subtlety and crudity, of tortuous intrigue and honest courage reveals more truths about the political animal man than are to be found in most textbooks of political science."

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RESHETAR, JOHN S., JR. *A Concise History of The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*. New York, Praeger, 1960. 331 pp. \$6.00.

SCHAPIRO, LEONARD. *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*. New York, Random House, 1959. 631 pp. \$7.50.

What do we expect of a history of the Soviet Communist Party? First, of course, a complete and lucid account of the facts: facts concerning power within the Party, the power of the Party, and policies advocated and pursued by the

Party, the Party as an instrument of revolution and of government, the Party in its relation to other such instruments, the Party within the setting of Russia and of world Communism. Over and above this, however, we look to a history of the Party as a source of understanding of the entire phenomenon of Communism. From a study of the Party's history we expect to emerge with a real grasp of the inner motivation that holds such a body as the Communist Party together, the identity which sets it apart as a peculiar company of people. In the case of the Communist Party, this would be the ideological intent that makes Communists recognize one another as "belonging," and causes its leaders to wield their power towards peculiar ends. To unseal the enigma of Communism in the sense of laying bare before our eyes the mainsprings of its energy—this is surely the ultimate task of histories of the CPSU.

Unlike the new *Istoriya Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza* (which by coincidence appeared in Moscow also in 1959), these two Western accounts of Party history are painstakingly accurate and complete as far as the facts are concerned. Mr. Reshetar devotes about two-thirds of his book to Party developments before Stalin. The period after Lenin's death, and particularly the history of the 'thirties, receives a somewhat summary treatment. His book is what the title says: a "precise" report on events, with strong emphasis on names, dates, and documents. Its briefness is an asset to the reader who wants to orient himself quickly though accurately.

Mr. Schapiro, by contrast has writ-

ten a full-fledged historical analysis that seeks to probe into the why and wherefore as it follows the tortuous path of the Party's inner and external struggles. If Schapiro in this respect accomplishes more than Reshetar, he has also given himself more space to do it in: his 236,000 words against Reshetar's 106,000 explain much of the difference. Schapiro is a masterful unraveller of complicated skeins of persons and policies. Never before have the muddled years between 1907 and 1912, the stormy times of 1917-1921, and the intrigues between 1924 and 1927 been so beautifully untangled. Schapiro has taken much more pains than Reshetar to analyze what he calls the Third Revolution, the "revolution from above" which Stalin initiated in 1929 and which to many people has stamped Communist rule with its mark of bloody terror. Schapiro's rendering of salient facts is likely to remain definitive in this field.

Is it, at the same time, the definitive key to an understanding of Communism? With all respect for Schapiro's achievement I am disposed to answer negatively. The deeper problems of understanding Communism have not been solved by either of these two books. What is more, unsolved difficulties of understanding the phenomenon rise doubts with regard to the adequacy of the facts as they are presented. Between 1904 and 1914 for instance, Lenin as the leader of the Bolsheviks was engaged in a number of controversies, conflicts, and bitter struggles with Russian Marxists. This story is told by Schapiro as that of a bull in the china shop. The china shop

is the Party, which is thereby conceded the character of an entity providing the sole "legitimate" framework for Russian Marxists, so that "loyalty," "treason," "conformity," etc. can be determined in terms of "Party legality." But what constitutes the basis for this common framework? The common cause, common ideology, or the common constituency (i.e., the proletariat)? All of these are precisely the points which were at issue between Lenin and his opponents. Was there then, at this time, anything one could call the "Party as a whole" which had a claim on Lenin's loyalty? Which was the proper demand revolutionary leaders should heed, "unity," or "split"? In this story Schapiro makes Lenin appear as a maverick (as, incidentally, Reshetar does, too). What, then, explains Lenin's actions? Only a quirk of his personality? It is significant that Schapiro, in analyzing Lenin's motives, gives only minuscule attention to his books. It is as if he had tried to understand Hitler without paying attention to *Mein Kampf*.

As a result, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is presented to a large extent as the product of Lenin's irascible, adamant, uncompromising temperament. The reader is given to understand, with a sad sense of missed opportunity, that towards his end, Lenin was apparently becoming more "liberal," which reminds one of C. S. Lewis's bishop who tried to speculate on what Christianity might not have become had only its founder not died an untimely death. Similarly, personal ambition is Schapiro's explanation for Stalin's decision to collectivize the farms

and to instigate the terror of the mid-thirties. This raises the unanswered question of why such figures as Lenin and Stalin emerge successful in the Communist Party. Why does the struggle for power not produce similar flowers of evil in other parties?

The deeper understanding of the Communist Party poses problems of tremendous difficulty. A movement characterized by consistent irrational behavior is to be explained in terms that make sense to the reader. Can Communist policies, Communist handling of power, Communist ideologies be presented in terms of everyday commonplace motives, such as "personal ambition"? Is the proper frame of reference in which we can understand the Communist Party that of conventional politics, gang criminality, or abnormal psychology? The successful historian of the Communist Party would have to start by building himself an adequate philosophical foundation, something like what Plato did in his description of tyranny. The Communists are people who have opted to cut themselves off from the truth that unites other people. They deny the realities on which the rest of mankind has based an orderly existence. In the Communist dreamworld, the mind is forced to operate on upside-down premises. Deprived of rational control, the soul of Communist leaders cannot help suffering deep and lasting injury. It is not an accident of personality but the necessary result of Communist ideologies that Stalin, in the long years of his rule, came himself to be governed by dark lawless passions and deep irrational fears.

It seems that those whose business it is to deal with the phenomenon of Communism have not yet succeeded in constructing a theoretical framework in which Communism can be adequately understood. The difficulties which our historians encounter are of the same nature as those that beset our policy makers. In the absence of suitable philosophical categories through which to classify the motives and actions of Communists, they attribute them to intentions that resemble our own. Communism then appears to be a case of personal aberrations imposed on an entire society through unusually effective power techniques. From this kind of analysis springs the perennial but wholly illusory hope for a future more "normal" generation of Communists who will lead their Party "back to liberalism."

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DALLIN, ALEXANDER. *The Soviet Conduct in World Affairs*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1960. 318 pp. \$4.50.

GOODMAN, ELLIOT R. *The Soviet Design for a World State*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1960. 512 pp. \$6.75.

RUBINSTEIN, ALVIN Z. *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*. New York, Random House, 1960. 457 pp. \$6.50.

Alexander Dallin, Elliot Goodman and Alvin Rubinstein are three of the outstanding group of young men of the post-World-War II generation of American scholars specializing in Soviet foreign relations. Goodman's book, which

grew out of his Columbia doctoral dissertation, is one of the most extensive studies of the international relations of the U.S.S.R. which have emerged in the post-war years. As Philip E. Mosely testifies in the Foreword, Soviet doctrine interposed with action determines much of Soviet foreign policy: "If doctrine does not dictate Communist actions in a literal sense, it does define the channels or grooves of thought upon which decisions are made and actions are taken."

In his encyclopedic book Professor Goodman attempts in an empirical fashion to detail the doctrinal and historical evidence of the pattern of Soviet world domination. This is not a propaganda book which sets out to prove a previously determined conclusion, but a work which aims to demonstrate out of historical example how Soviet power has evolved into a theoretical and factual program for the design of a world state. More than most works on Soviet foreign policy, this book proceeds to show in copious detail how the foundation of the Soviet design has been developed in Marxist theory and how this theory has interacted throughout the Soviet Union's forty-odd-year history. The author shows how the Soviet Union is the prototype of the world state. While Stalin authorized such statements as the one appearing in 1930, "... every country which has concluded a socialist revolution will enter the U.S.S.R.," the author concedes that it would not be stated as bluntly as this today. The Comintern has theoretically come and gone and so has the Cominform. But Goodman states, "It would seem, rather, that a Soviet

world state is not a goal whose realization is anticipated in a matter of days, weeks, months, or at most, a brief span of years, as was the case in the early period of the Comintern."

Khrushchev told us two years ago in Leipzig in March 1959 that there will be "the consolidation of a single world socialist economic system." This strengthens Goodman's thesis that in *Soviet eyes*, a world state of the Socialist world is on the way.

Goodman shows how Soviet nationalism became interwoven with proletarian internationalism and how Soviet nationalism became "more equal" than other nationalism. While the Soviet Union seemed to some a bourgeois nation state by 1934 when the Soviets entered the League of Nations and heightened their use of national symbols, Goodman demonstrates that they never recanted their design for a world state.

The experience of World War II in regard to the extermination of many non-Russian people for disloyalty did not in the reviewer's opinion demonstrate a wholesale defection of non-Russian people. The "widespread disloyalty of non-Russian groups" (p. 93) can be questioned, although the story of large disaffection among non-Russian groups as described by the author cannot be challenged.

What World War II showed was that the solidarity of the Soviet nation state, as developed in theory, was not as monolithic in reality as Soviet propaganda has charged. After World War II the Soviets restated the concept of proletarian internationalism as based on Soviet nationalism: "The social-

ist internationalism of the citizens of the U. S. S. R. is organically blended with Soviet patriotism." Professor Goodman goes on to analyze the significance of the idea of "Socialism in One Country" and the doctrine of peaceful coexistence and shows how this latter doctrine is ultimately incompatible with the idea of the Soviet world state.

Space limits discussion of other significant aspects of the Soviet pattern of a world state. Mention should be made of the unusual chapter on the Soviet plan of reshaping national languages according to the Soviet interest. Russian would become the *lingua franca* of the world. Another valuable chapter is on the Soviet use of war and armaments or their opposites, peace and disarmament, as instruments to build a world state. This policy of "bluster and nuclear blackmail" is charged with the possibility that if the bluff cannot be held back, the world does truly face a general holocaust. Goodman's final chapter makes the plea for greater unity and accord in the non-Soviet world because when the Soviets are faced with weakness, they are aggressive but when faced with strength they act cautiously. This is an outstanding book with much erudition for the scholar and much food for thought for the public leader and citizen.

Alexander Dallin and Alvin Rubinstein have prepared selections of readings on Soviet foreign policy. Dallin's *The Soviet Conduct in World Affairs* includes perceptive articles reprinted from journals, and chapters from books by such well-known scholars in Soviet studies as Barrington Moore, Richard Lowenthal, Nathan Leites,

Philip Mosely, George Kennan, Robert Tucker, Bertram Wolfe, Alex Inkeles, Henry Roberts, Marshall Shulman, and several others. These scholarly pieces all speak for themselves. Professor Dallin has used excellent judgment in selecting and arranging these readings. Teachers of Soviet Foreign Policy will find the Dallin book of readings extremely valuable as a teaching aid.

Alvin Rubinstein's *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union* is a more ambitious effort in the nature of a book of readings. While Dallin includes some fifteen selected items of full chapter length, Rubinstein has selected eighty-eight more abbreviated items on Soviet Foreign Policy. Dallin's readings are wholly topical in their arrangement while Rubinstein's are presented in chronological and topical fashion. Prefacing each chapter containing an average of seven readings arranged by historical periods of Soviet foreign policy, Rubinstein has written some twelve valuable introductions which place the readings in historical perspective. This is extremely valuable for students.

The last four chapters of Rubinstein's book are concerned with highly important current problems of Soviet foreign policy such as disarmament, the development of underdeveloped areas (two chapters) and a final chapter, "Negotiating with the Soviet Union and Continuity and Change in Soviet Policy." The material on the Soviet policy toward the underdeveloped areas is of especial significance, since Professor Rubinstein has done the pioneering research in that field. What com-

mends Rubinstein's book as a text is the helpful extensive bibliography and chronology at the end of the work. Both Dallin and Rubinstein have done inestimable service to the profession in arranging these valuable materials for publication.

WILLIAM B. BALLIS

The University of Michigan

SELZNICK, PHILIP. *The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics*. Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1960. 350 pp. \$6.00.

"The proletariat," once said Lenin, "has no other weapon in the fight for power except organization." About ten years ago, Professor Selznick was encouraged by the Rand Corporation to undertake a systematic study of Bolshevik use of organization as a weapon, and this volume is the result. For those who missed the first printing in 1952, the present edition will be most welcome; it bears witness to the author's achievement that it was unnecessary to make any revision for this new issuance.

The Organizational Weapon is not a history of the Communist party, nor even of the Communists' use of organization as a tool in the struggle for power. It is basically a theoretical analysis focussed simultaneously on the socio-political phenomenon of the use of organization to achieve power, and on the role of this technique in Communist behavior. As Selznick states, "No group has a monopoly on the use of organizational weapons." Nonetheless, the author does use to advantage a rich store of data (much of it from

still unpublished sources) on the operations of seven selected Communist parties operating under very different circumstances, including the Soviet and U. S. examples. While Selznick's own interest is perhaps greater in the distillation of a theoretical "model" of the use of organization as a weapon (a fact emphasized in the new preface), the student of Russian and Soviet politics will profit from the fact that an interloper into the field has something to add well worth the attention of the area specialist. While the importance of Lenin's contribution of organizational discipline to Communism is generally well understood, and while Communist tactics of subversion and infiltration are only too familiar, the thoroughgoing examination of the political sociology of war by organization which the volume provides still has a useful message.

The significance of the relationship between Marxist views of the role of "the masses" and Leninist views of the role of the Party as "the vanguard"; the ideological foundation for molding the party along pseudo-military lines; the strategies of gaining access to target groups and then gaining control over them; the techniques of penetration and infiltration—these and other major aspects of the general problem are defined, illustrated, and examined in detail. Of particular interest is the discussion of "dual power," the pursuit of tactics of cooperation with a group, coupled with simultaneous infiltration and subversion of that same group. In discussing these techniques, the author demonstrates well his thesis that: "Although

ideology, to be translated into power, requires organization, effective organization also requires ideology." Finally, the author goes beyond description of the Communist use of the organizational weapon to discuss in his final two chapters the "vulnerability of institutional targets" and "problems of the counteroffense."

In criticism not of this book but of the conclusions some readers might draw from it, it must be noted that the organizational weapon remains but one of the residents of the Soviet arsenal, one they do not always succeed in using well, and moreover one which is not effective under all conditions in which the Soviets seek to advance.

There are only a few judgments in the book which this reviewer would question. (For example, Selznick's comment in passing that "Stalinism has made Leninism more flexible." We could better say now that Khrushchev has made Stalinism more flexible again, by an effort to reinterpret Lenin today.) Also, there are a few infelicities such as the choice of the term "Stalinoid" as a preferred synonym for fellow-traveler. But these are minor flaws indeed in a book which deserves a return to circulation.

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF

The Rand Corporation
Washington, D. C.

SAPOSS, DAVID J. *Communism in American Politics*. Washington, D. C., Public Affairs Press, 1960. 259 pp. \$5.00.

Following closely on the heels of his *Communism in American Unions* (McGraw-Hill, 1959), David J.

Saposs' new book continues his effort to "realert the American people toward the menace of Communism." More specifically, it was designed to "help some readers understand why and how a Communist minority could become subversively powerful in our political life." Although it falls somewhat short of this objective, it is not without virtue.

Basically, Saposs' thesis is as follows: In their early history, from 1919 to 1925, American Communists sought to capture assorted unions and radical organizations—only to find that after the battle dust had settled there was no one left but Communists. Weary of "capturing themselves," they moved to subtler means of infiltrating the progressive and reform wings of established political parties. Here they met with greater success—in Washington, California, and in the Minnesota Farmer Labor Party; but the success was short-lived as they were exposed and defeated. During the late 'thirties and the wartime alliance, however, a pro-Soviet atmosphere made possible a more open Communist participation in political popular fronts, notably the American Labor Party. ALP played a balance of power role in New York politics because of its substantial trade union support; but when Dubinsky got out in 1944, followed by the CIO in 1948, the Communists were left holding little more than the local affiliate of their new national popular front—the Progressive Party. However, Saposs notes, "even with a popular figure like Wallace, a Communist-tainted, pro-Soviet party could arouse little support" and in 1952, without Wallace, the Pro-

gressive showing was reduced to pitiful proportions. Drawing back upon themselves once more, the Communists underwent a post-Stalin flagellation that reduced their party to its hard core; but the stalwarts who remain, Saposs warns, are waiting in the wings, "ready for enlarged, open, and clandestine activity whenever a favorable intellectual climate and propitious conditions present themselves."

Many of the elements of Saposs' story are available elsewhere in more adequate form. His introductory chapters on early party history are thin compared with the definitive studies by Theodore Draper. His concluding chapters on the post-Stalin party skip lightly over ground already well-worked by David Shannon, Irving Howe and Lewis Coser. His chapters on the states of Washington and California are uncritically reconstructed from reports and hearings of units such as the Tenney Committee and the House Un-American Activities Committee. But all the foregoing constitute less than half of the book and were obviously included to provide setting and perspective for the two stories which Saposs tells best—those of the ALP and the Progressive Party. Here Saposs draws from much more varied sources and reconstructs the stories with a bit more passion. He illustrates the role of the Communists in both these parties; he notes how these parties rode high—relatively—when conditions were propitious and intellectual climate was favorable; and he notes how they collapsed when their Communist nature was laid bare. It cannot fairly be said that

Saposs adds anything new to the story, but he has done a workman-like job of synthesizing.

So what may we conclude when the story is done? It is not enough merely to quote lengthy admonitions from J. Edgar Hoover in lieu of conclusions. Saposs set out to show "how a Communist minority could become subversively powerful in our political life." That they were a minority is easily demonstrated; that they were subversive—that is, acting in behalf of a foreign power—is also adequately proved; but that they were "powerful in American political life" remains to be convincingly shown.

ROBERT W. IVERSEN

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TANG, PETER S. H. *Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, 1911-1931*. Durham, North Carolina, Duke University Press, 1959. 494 pp. \$10.00.

In Dr. Tang we have a scholar of Chinese descent, who, in addition to English, has also a knowledge of Chinese and of Russian, judging by the original Russian sources used in the work, which covers Russo-Chinese relations in Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, and Tannu Tuva. Dr. Tang's study covers the 1911 to 1931 period from the collapse of the Ch'ing Dynasty to the Japanese entry into Northern Manchuria, a comparatively short but immensely important period in the political life of Manchuria. His coverage of two decades in turbulent Manchuria makes exciting reading, especially to those in close contact with those events. The book contains a wealth of

references, making it a well-documented source of useful information for researchers in this field of foreign relations for years to come.

The author presents a clear picture with accurate background data, valuable for understanding subsequent Russian moves in the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway across the plains and mountains of Manchuria. The material is conveniently divided in several distinct parts. He presents the Chinese Eastern Railway as an instrument of Russian and Soviet policy in Manchuria. Next follows a description of Outer Mongolia, as a center of Russian and Soviet strategy in the Far East. He also acutely analyzes the fate of Tannu Tuva. The author was able to trace the reasons for the controversies and constant irritations on the part of the Chinese and Russian partners in the contract signed by them for the construction of the railway. Dr. Tang conclusively states and proves that the above contract for the construction and operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway, signed by both countries in 1896, indicates a divergence between the Chinese and the Russian texts. This fact led to a multitude of far-reaching misunderstandings between the two countries.

In spite of the general excellence of presentation and abundance of source materials, the author lapses into occasional errors, which, however, do not diminish the overall value of the book. He, for example, states that the Russian management of the Chinese Eastern Railway "controlled all the elementary schools, high schools, and two universities . . ." and that, "in 1915 the total expense borne by

the railway for the maintenance of these schools amounted to 1,143,000 gold rubles, of which 200,000 were used for the Law Faculty and the Polytechnical Institute in Harbin." (p. 112). The veracity of these figures is not questioned, but the statement regarding the existence of institutions of higher learning in the C. E. R. area at the time must be corrected. Contrary to Dr. Tang's statement, there was no Law School (Law Faculty) or Polytechnical Institute in Harbin in pre-revolutionary times (1915), and the railway supported only elementary and high schools. Both these institutions of higher learning were the result and product of a heavy influx of prominent Russian scholars and scientists after the Revolution in Russia, who founded both institutions only in 1920. Mr. Tsao Lien-en's work, *The Chinese Eastern Railway*, may have been the cause for this misconception.

The author also stated that, "In addition, the Tsarist Government was said to have 'strenuously disseminated Christianity in all North Manchuria,'" to which Dr. Tang added: "As Skalov pointed out, 'Harbin became one of the most important missionary centers, where the Orthodox priests taught the Chinese boys belief in the 'Russian God', and also, which was perhaps more to the point, the belief in the Russian Tsar.'" (p. 112). For obvious reasons Dr. Tang should not place so much credence in Soviet authors. It is known that Russian priests were the poorest of missionaries and notoriously inefficient in China. This especially refers to their activity in Manchuria, where their preoccupation

was to attend almost exclusively to the needs of the Russian personnel of the railway and of the Russian armed guards stationed there. Not a single priest in Harbin or along the line of the C. E. R. could speak Chinese, and consequently could not be a missionary to the Chinese. The exception was, perhaps, the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Peking, which, however, had no jurisdiction over Manchuria. At the time Skalov wrote the above quotation, Soviet writers certainly used every effort to besmirch anything that was connected with the activity of the Tsarist officials. There are also several minor errors present: Preshkov (p. 118) should be General Pleshkov; there are several references to Port Egresheld which should be Egersheld; Ashibo railway station (p. 208) should be Ashiho. These could be typographical errors.

In conclusion Dr. Tang describes Russian efforts to gradually colonize the territory of Tannu Tuva, which was finally annexed by the Soviet Union in 1944. The documentary evidence given by Dr. Tang is abundant in proving long and continuous Russian efforts in that direction, although the author would have profited by using also the information provided by the Russian "special agent" S. R. Mintslov, sent to Tannu Tuva in 1915 by the Russian Resettlement Administration. (S. R. Mintslov, *Sekretnoe Poruchenie* (Secret Mission), Riga).

All in all, the work of Dr. Tang in the estimation of the reviewer is very useful in helping researchers to understand the intricacies of power politics in the vast territories of Manchuria, Outer Mon-

golia, and Tannu Tuva, and it certainly can be recommended not only to specialists, but to the general reader as well.

VICTOR P. PETROV
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Washington, D. C.*

CONQUEST, R. *The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1960. 203 pp. \$6.75.

As a result of World War II the Soviet regime deported the populations of seven nationalities (numbering together between 1.25 and 1.4 million) who disappeared from the maps of the Soviet Union and actually became "un-nations" for a decade. Although five of these nationalities were rehabilitated and partially repatriated to their native territories in 1956 and in 1957, two were not: the Crimean Tatars and the Volga Germans. It is significant that all of the Mongol and Turkic groups (including the Kalmyks, Karachai, and Balkarians) as well as the Chechens and Ingushi who came into contact with the Germans during the war were deported for disloyalty to Moscow in spite of the fact that in Soviet election returns the deportees were said to have supported the regime with 99.7 percent majorities.

Mr. Conquest, a well-known British poet, has performed a task of painstaking research akin to detective work. The entire volume, with the exception of one brief chapter, is based exclusively upon official Soviet sources, making it a very effective and sobering treatment of one of the most sordid pages in the long history of Rus-

sian colonialism. These Soviet sources include encyclopedia articles, journals, decrees, public statements and even specific broadcasts of minor Soviet radio stations.

The volume opens with a description of each ethnic group and a treatment of the slow and uneven process by which these nationalities were originally brought under Russian rule. Here the author's literary knowledge is utilized; Pushkin's and Lermontov's observations are cited together with their justification of Russian imperialism. Tolstoy's forceful description of the fierce Chechen hatred of the Russians is also quoted. All available data on the deportations, though fragmentary and not conveying the full horror of their cruel uprooting, are sufficient to indicate the enormity of this violation of the right of national self-determination. Mr. Conquest skillfully surveys the ideological basis of the Leninist-Stalinist nationality policy—none of which has been abandoned as the result of the all too brief "de-Stalinization." He demonstrates how the Soviet rulers have consistently minimized the importance of national consciousness and have dedicated themselves to the ultimate eradication of cultural differences while cynically attempting to utilize the aspirations of nationalities outside the Soviet sphere.

Mr. Conquest does not claim to have investigated all Soviet deportations based upon nationality; he recognizes that even more Balts and Ukrainians were deported. He writes with a touch of appropriate irony at times. He contends that the Soviet rulers do not comprehend the wellsprings of national-

ism and that the economic growth which they take credit for bestowing upon the non-Russian nationalities will not in itself induce these peoples to be loyal. Mr. Conquest believes that the five nationalities were rehabilitated as a result of an active interest in their fate manifested by various Asians and because of the unceasing efforts of the Kalmyk émigrés. He also suggests that the United Nations has cause to investigate whether the Soviet government fulfilled its obligations under the

This is a disturbing, revealing, guilty officials.

This is a disturbing, revealing and provocative volume based upon unimpeachable scholarship. It should be read by all who wish to understand the Soviet rulers as well as by those to whom the Soviet siren song of "anti-colonialism" is directed.

JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR.
University of Washington,
Seattle

BAILEY, GEOFFREY. *The Conspirators*. New York, Harper & Bros., 1960. 306 pp. \$4.95.

This book is a tragic and stirring story of heroes and traitors, and sometimes we do not know definitely whether a person is a hero or a traitor. It describes the infiltration by Soviet agents of the anti-Communist émigré organizations of Western Europe and the kidnapping of Generals Kutepov and Miller in Paris. A part of the book is devoted to Soviet purges and the liquidation of top commanders of the Red Army.

The identity of the author of this book is not disclosed. "Geoffrey

Bailey" is a pseudonym. He is extremely well informed on his subject. He not only knows the Russian language but is very familiar with Russian life at the beginning of the Bolshevik Revolution. He has gathered a great deal of material, using a bibliography of 185 books in four languages. Sometimes, however, the story is so overburdened by detail (not always correct) that the crux of events is obscured.

It is unfortunate that the author does not emphasize clearly the inequality of the opposing forces. Here on one side was the whole might of a dictatorial state with its limitless resources, and on the other a group of penniless Russian refugees, who despite all misfortunes never ceased to continue the uneven struggle. This inequality of forces is dramatically brought home to the reader in the story of one of the leading figures among the anti-Communists, a young woman named Madame Maria Zakharchenko-Shultz. She was so feared by the Soviet security organization that when, being quite alone, she was surrounded by a large Soviet detachment, the Communists did not dare to attack her and took her only at the end of a day-long battle, when she had used all her cartridges and was already fatally wounded.

As to the means of support for this unequal struggle, its leader, General Kutepov, had quite inadequate funds and often got money from his former officers who had already become Paris taxi-drivers and factory workers.

To counteract the anti-Communist activity, the Soviets had created an intricate system of

agents-provocateurs. To one of them, a certain Oppenput, known to this reviewer, the author devotes an 18-page chapter. It is a fascinating and of course tragic story. Oppenput, a high official of the Cheka and himself a former officer, penetrated the White émigré organization in Paris. They trusted the sincerity of his intentions and even Maria Zakharchenko-Shultz went with him on her last illegal trip to Soviet Russia. She was caught; Oppenput disappeared. Did he fall in battle as she did, or did he betray her to his former masters? Did he come over to the Whites according to his own sincere wish or was he sent to hunt and betray? This is still an unsolved problem. The majority of historians, as well as the author of *The Conspirators*, definitely treat him as an agent-provocateur. But still it can be supposed that General Kutepov and especially Maria Sakharchenko-Shultz had some reasons to trust him. She did not hesitate even to cross the frontier with him. The reviewer here presents a translation of an unpublished letter from Oppenput to General Kutepov which was taken with the General's consent from his apartment at 26 rue Rousselet, in Paris, in 1928:

Dear Alexander Pavlovich:

Allow me to express to you a deep gratitude for the confidence you have given me in such complicated and involved circumstances. I thank you for the possibility you have given me not only to prove my great desire to struggle for Russia but to be in the ranks of the first crusaders of the new and probably decisive struggle

against the Communist government.

I firmly believe that the path of the struggle chosen by us is right and express hope that even if first attempts fail and we shall not have the luck to return, you will still steadfastly follow this road and will direct along it all vital forces of the Russian people.

I am not sure that we will be able to return, because our activity has stirred up a Soviet wasps' nest, and besides, the general tense situation is not favorable for us. Without me, my wife and my daughter will be insecure. At present you have of course no time to think about them. But when the new dawn rises over Russia, I ask you not to leave them alone.

Wishing you luck and success in the struggle for the well-being of Russia and the Russian people,

Respectfully yours,

Oppenput

Was he sincerely repenting, or was he just a cold-blooded traitor?

The author of the book deals at length with another man who proved to be a monstrous traitor to the cause for which he pretended to struggle and in which he occupied an outstanding position. That was the Commander of the Kornilov Division, General Skoblin. General Kornilov was one of the chief organizers of the White Army in Southern Russia. He was killed in a battle with the Red Army. One of the best regiments of the White Army was named in his honor the Kornilov regiment. The young officer, Skoblin, was promoted to the

rank of general and was appointed commander of the Kornilov Division. During the Civil War and later on during the emigration he was considered one of the top heroes of the White Army. But in fact for years and years he betrayed the anti-Communist cause. How long it lasted and what were his motives remain unknown. In 1937 he arranged the kidnapping by Soviet agents of his superior, the head of the Russian Veterans Organization, General Miller. A cautious and experienced General Staff officer, General Miller left a note which disclosed that Skoblin was in the kidnapping plot. On learning about the existence of this note, Skoblin managed to disappear and was never heard of again. But a few days before this fatal day there was a solemn meeting in Paris on the occasion of a White Army anniversary. General Miller was sitting in a chair; beside him on one side sat Skoblin and on the other Skoblin's wife, the singer Plevitskaya. I was present at this meeting and heard White Army veterans say one to another, "The White cause will not die while we have in our ranks such men as Skoblin."

The author of *The Conspirators* thinks that Skoblin betrayed not only the White leaders but also the Red Army marshals. But there is no real evidence that such a "plot" really existed, in spite of what Bailey says. Some of the executed Red marshals have now been rehabilitated by the Soviet government. Would such a rehabilitation be possible if there had really been a plot?

ARKADY BORMAN
Washington, D. C.

MARCUSE, HERBERT. *Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1958. 371 pp. \$4.50.

Mr. Marcuse's essay on Soviet Marxism has been widely hailed as a lucid and penetrating investigation of the subject. That it could be so received testifies only to the foggy misconceptions that becloud the minds of many of the American students of Soviet affairs who make up Marcuse's audience. *Soviet Marxism* is one of the most confused books I have ever read, and it does a positive disservice to the cause of political enlightenment about the Communist movement.

Mr. Marcuse sets himself a challenging aim — to explain the changes in Soviet theory in relation to Soviet political and social activity. In the two parts of his book he undertakes to explain the development of the "political tenets" and the "ethical tenets" in Soviet doctrine. Unfortunately, he never succeeds in stating clearly just what these tenets are, or how they relate to Marxism. His analysis is vitiated from the start by three fallacious assumptions: (a) that the categories of Marxian sociology are valid; (b) that Russia fits these categories; (c) that the Soviet leaders take theory as seriously, honestly, and carefully as Mr. Marcuse does.

Marcuse undertakes an "immanent critique," meaning that he starts from the theoretical premises of Marxism, and this begs the whole question, because history has proved such fundamental Marxist premises as the historical mission of the proletariat to be largely nonsense. He never shakes off the myth that Soviet Russia represents Marx's dictatorship of

the proletariat. This is strange, because Marcuse is quite realistic about social changes in Soviet Russia, the role of the party and totalitarian state, and even about the Victorianism which the government tries to enjoin on the populace. This, however, is not the main point of the book. In the realm of theory, Marcuse is in a blind alley in trying to study the literal terms of Soviet doctrine as a reflection of Soviet social realities.

Where the actual description of Soviet life comes into his presentation, Mr. Marcuse is on firmer ground. His recognition of Soviet realities, while familiar, is noteworthy in coming clearly through the ideological mist. For all his effort to take Soviet Marxism seriously, Mr. Marcuse shows us the true Soviet system of totalitarian state capitalism, where the state has assumed the historical mission of intensive economic development and all of the totalitarian political implications of this mission. The social ethic which was worked out to facilitate this industrialization effort has some remarkable parallels with current trends in the capitalist world — discipline, conformity, toil and self-sacrifice for the good of the organization, a sort of Calvinist work-ethic with a collective rather than individualistic basis. In his characteristically oblique style, Mr. Marcuse writes: "The coordination between private and public existence, which, at the post-liberal stage of Western society, takes place largely unconsciously and behind the backs of the individuals, occurs, in the Soviet Union, in the light of a well-trained consciousness and as a publicized program." The main

East-West difference seems to be that this ethic of integration into the group is more deeply internalized in individuals in the West than in the USSR, which accordingly still has to rely on a good deal of repression to get the coordinated performance which it wants. In any case we see that the familiar neo-Marxist expectation of industrialization promoting individual freedom is sheer fantasy.

Such conclusions, of course, have nothing to do with the logical validity of Soviet doctrine. Every student of Soviet thought and culture should understand at the outset that present-day Communist theory has no intellectual respectability at all. It is an irrational political contrivance, incorporating sweeping revisions and distortions of the Marxian background under the priggish mantle of obligatory orthodoxy. The only point in studying Soviet Marxism is to understand why the Soviet leaders have to be so childishly belligerent to cover up the nonsense they have made of their ideological heritage.

ROBERT V. DANIELS

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POGGIOLI, RENATO. *The Poets of Russia: 1890-1930*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960. 383 pp. \$8.75.

So far there has been no comprehensive study of modern Russian poetry in any Western language. Even the main currents in it have been insufficiently investigated. L. Strakhovsky's study of the three Acmeist poets—Gumilyov, Akhmatova, and Mandelstam — makes no attempt to relate Acme-

ism to Symbolism or to examine the relation of each of those poets to the principles of Acmeism as they were proclaimed by Gumilyov and Gorodetsky. J. Lavrin's book *From Pushkin to Mayakovsky* (incidentally, not listed in the bibliography of Professor Poggioli's book) consists of portraits of individual Russian writers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the only pre-revolutionary modernist poet included in it is Alexander Blok (Esenin and Mayakovsky, also included, belong largely to the post-revolutionary period). Of late, there have appeared two books, one in German and one in English, which contain a great deal of valuable information of a general nature about Russian Symbolism but cannot be described as full-length studies of it; I have in mind J. Holthusen's *Studien zur Aesthetik und Poetik des russischen Symbolismus* (1957) and G. Donchin's *The Influence of French Symbolism on Russian Poetry* (1958). Some individual Symbolist poets have fared better and some of the books about them are useful for the understanding of Russian Symbolism in general. One can mention Mme. S. Bonneau's capital study of Blok and Professor Maslennikov's on early Andrey Bely and his relations with his fellow poets. Two recent dissertations on Gumilyov, one produced in Brussels and the other in Paris, still remain unpublished. There have also been books about Esenin and Mayakovsky, and studies of Annensky, Mandelstam and Khlebnikov are known to be in preparation.

For that matter, there are no comprehensive studies of the modernist period in Russian. Russian

Modernism — to give it a comprehensive if somewhat meaningless name—is looked upon unfavorably in the Soviet Union and only two modernist poets of the pre-revolutionary period are studied there; they are Valery Bryusov and Alexander Blok. But the Soviet books about Bryusov and Blok, even when they deal with a rather narrow area as, for example, a recent volume of Blok's narrative poems by G. Remenik, are one-sided or frankly biased. This bias is felt even more when an attempt is made to study a literary movement or a given period; witness, a little book by A. Volkov which purports to be a study of Acmeist poets: its very title—*The Poetry of Russian Imperialism*—lets the cat out of the bag and reveals the inadequacy of its approach. Even the early post-revolutionary period is still awaiting its impartial appraiser. The late A. Selivanovsky's *Ocherki po istorii russkoi sovetskoi poezii* (1930), interesting and useful though it may be, is strongly biased.

For entirely different reasons, Russian émigré critics and scholars have also failed to produce a comprehensive survey of modern Russian poetry, while in the ways of monographs about individual poets we only have the two books of the late K. Mochulsky, the one on Blok and the one (unfinished) on Bely.

The situation is rendered more difficult, where the impartial historian is concerned, by two facts: (1) For the poets who belong essentially to the pre-revolutionary period, with the exception of Blok, Bryusov, and now Annensky (a volume of whose poems and plays was published last year in the

Bolshaya Biblioteka Poeta series), there are no recent scholarly editions of their works, and (2) the archives of that period are for the most part not explored by Soviet scholars and inaccessible to those outside the Soviet Union.

This makes Professor Poggioli's merit all the greater. He is, indeed, the first to fill in an important gap by providing this overall study of modern Russian poetry against the double background of Russian poetic tradition since the eighteenth century and the general picture of Russian spiritual culture on the eve of the Revolution and in the Soviet period. Despite fairly numerous defects of detail, which will be mentioned below and which, it is hoped, will be removed in the subsequent editions, the book is an extremely valuable contribution to our knowledge of Russian literature. It will be appreciated by students of modern poetry on the comparative plane no less than by students of Russian poetry: Professor Poggioli, who is at home in all Western literatures, and has been for many years teaching Comparative Literature at Harvard, constantly keeps his sights on antecedent or parallel developments in the West. In fact, one of his most meaty and stimulating chapters—even if not all of his opinions will be generally endorsed—is the one which compares Russian Symbolism with its Western prototypes and parallels. Similarly, he juxtaposes Russian Futurism with Western advance-guard movements.

Generally speaking, Poggioli is most successful when he discusses certain general problems. In addition to the sections just named, I

would single out his ruthless characterization of the state to which literature has been reduced in the Soviet Union since 1930, at the beginning of Chapter 9: "The Poets of Yesterday." The initial section of this chapter is significantly entitled "The Twilight of Poetry and Art." Interesting, though controversial, is Poggioli's discussion of the relation between Decadence and Symbolism in general and in Russia in particular. His own grouping and treatment of individual poets is based on the demarcation between the two, and to some people the assigning of this or that poet to one or the other group among pre-revolutionary Russian Modernists may appear arbitrary and strange. Thus among the Decadents are included not only Bryusov and Balmont but also Gippius (Hippius) and Sologub and — surprisingly enough — Bunin, both as a poet and as a prose writer. Among the Symbolists we find not only Blok (the only one to have a whole chapter devoted to him), Andrey Bely, Vyacheslav Ivanov, and Baltrushaitis, but also Annensky and Voloshin. While with regard to the former this may well seem justified, the inclusion of Voloshin arouses great doubts. In the end, however, Poggioli himself is forced to admit that the best way of solving the problem and doing away with all terminological confusion would be to say that "all the Russian and Western poets of that age were born Decadents, although many of them made themselves into Symbolists," and adopt the following simple rule: "That there were Decadents who were not Symbolists, but that there was no Symbolist who was

not a Decadent as well." (p. 149.) But if that is so, then the line of demarcation should be drawn elsewhere.

One might perhaps reproach Poggioli for being too fond of classifications, although one must admit their convenience in arranging such a book. Thus he groups together, in a chapter entitled "The Neo-Parnassians," Kuzmin (whom, in my opinion, he tends to underrate and whose last book he does not mention at all) the Acmeists, and Klyuev, the last-named cutting a rather strange figure in this company. On the other hand, Mandelstam is not discussed with the Acmeists, but in a later chapter entitled "The Poets of Yesterday," which, apart from a brilliant general introduction mentioned above, includes a short and rather inadequate section on émigré writers and separate sections on Khodasevich, Mandelstam, and Tsvetaeva, the idea apparently being to stress the validity of these three very different poets for our own time. (At the same time Mandelstam and Khodasevich are said to form "a triad" with Pasternak.) Another Acmeist, Georgy Ivanov, is briefly discussed with the "Neo-Parnassians," and no light is thrown on his development after *Rozy*, although the claim of some of his admirers that he should be regarded as the foremost émigré poet is mentioned; Poggioli himself obviously reserves this place for Khodasevich. It may be mentioned here that the terminal date of Poggioli's survey, 1930, included in his title, must be taken as a rough indication of the demise of true poetry in Soviet Russia; as regards the activity of the poets

who made their mark before that date, Poggioli does go outside his own chronological limits, and, in theory at least, this applies also to émigré poets though actually there is all too little discussion of their work in exile. (There is, for instance, no mention of Gippius's émigré poetry, while such poets as Ladinsky, Odoevtseva, Otsup, and Smolensky are apparently not known to Poggioli; for non-inclusion of those who made themselves known after 1930, and especially after World War II, there were, of course, good reasons.)

The author did well to precede his examination of modern Russian poets with a brief survey of the developments in Russian poetry before 1890, devoting to them his first chapter, "The Masters of the Past." The central section in that chapter is given to Pushkin and provides a good overall view of his achievement and his place in Russian literature. Pushkin's successors are grouped under two headings: "Romanticism" and "Realism." Under the first heading come Lermontov and Tyutchev, under the second—strangely enough—Nekrasov and Fet, with a few lesser poets thrown in in both sections. In the case of Nekrasov, Poggioli fails to make clear why Nekrasov is generally regarded as one of the great poets of the century and whence his appeal to so many of the modern poets, not only Blok and Bely—whom Poggioli mentions—but also Gumilyov, Akhmatova, and Vyacheslav Ivanov. Incidentally, Nekrasov's famous dictum about the poet and the citizen seems to me to have been unsatisfactorily translated by Poggioli. The least satisfactory in

this initial chapter is the earlier section on eighteenth-century poets and on Pushkin's predecessors in the nineteenth century. Poggioli underestimates Lomonosov as a poet and does not even mention Sumarokov (the two were once described to me by Vladimir Markov as, respectively, the Futurist and the Acmeist of the eighteenth century). What he says about Zhukovsky is debatable and his paragraph on Batyushkov is all too short.

While providing a historical perspective of his survey of modern Russian poetry, Poggioli sets it also in relief by discussing the contemporaneous developments in Russian thought, in plastic arts (*Mir Iskusstva*, the beginnings of Russian Cubism, etc.), and in the theatre. Nor does he, in dealing with his main period, confine himself to poetry, but touches also upon the developments in prose fiction.

The last chapter of the book is entitled "Poets of Today" (pp. 316-342). Of the four sections of which it consists—not counting the "Epilogue"—three deal with Pasternak: his life and career, his poetry, and "The Case of *Doctor Zhivago*." What Poggioli has to say here is, in the main, a reworking of his essays published in *The Partisan Review*. His appraisal of Pasternak's great novel and of his poetic development after 1940 will not be acceptable to many people and would have been opposed by the poet himself. It is a pity that Poggioli when he wrote his book could not become acquainted with Pasternak's own choice from his poetry for the volume of *Selected Poems* which he

was preparing for publication in 1957 when the storm caused by *Doctor Zhivago* broke over his head and made the publication of that volume impossible. (It was for that volume that Pasternak wrote his "Autobiographical Sketch.")

It is unfortunate that there should be so many mistakes (some of them may be misprints) in dates and other facts in this book. If there is another edition of it they should be corrected. Here are some of them: Zhukovsky died in 1852, not 1837 (p. 11); *Poltava* was written in 1828, not 1823 (p. 22); Tyutchev was born in *Oryol* Province (p. 33); he was Tolstoy's, not Dostoevsky's, favorite poet (p. 35); Aleksey Tolstoy did not begin his career by creating Kozma Prutkov (p. 38); Nekrasov died in 1877, not 1878 (p. 40); Balmont died in 1942 and not in Brittany (p. 89); Bunin was born in 1870, not 1877, and died in 1953, not 1954 (pp. 113 and 115); Gippius's *Zhivye litsa* did not appear under her pseudonym (p. 112); there could be no "separate issue" of Blok's "Solovyiny sad" in 1913 (p. 187), for that poem was first published in *Russkoe Slovo* in 1915, and a separate edition appeared only in 1918; on p. 154 the chronology of Bely's Symphonies is wrongly given; Gumilyov was not caught in Paris by the February Revolution of 1917 (p. 224); he went to France in May 1917, was caught there by the October Revolution and returned to Russia in April 1918; Akhmatova was born in 1888, not 1889 (p. 229); in the passage from the 1912 Futurist manifesto on p. 242 "a villa on the Riviera" has become "a villa on the river"; the Imaginist manifesto appeared in 1919, not

in 1921 (p. 253); Tsvetaeva returned to Russia in 1939, not 1941 (p. 313); what Pasternak was planning to publish in 1957 was not "a new, complete edition of his poetic works" (p. 330), but a volume of selected poems; its composition is, by the way, now known; on p. 335, in the famous quotation from Pasternak, it should be "millenium," not "century."

There are also some rather dubious or erroneous statements which the author would be well advised to reconsider. Is Aleksey Tolstoy's *Prince Serebryany* really the best Russian historical novel after Pushkin's *The Captain's Daughter*? Can one speak of Klyuev and Esenin having been "greatly influenced" by Koltsov? Is it right to describe Aleksey Tolstoy and Polonsky as "active upholders of the tsarist regime"? Is it true that Russian bureaucratic nobility was "devoid of a moral code" (p. 49)? This is a kind of statement that should not be allowed in a serious scholarly work. To say that the Russian Church "fell" with the fall of the Russian *ancien régime* is, to say the least, strange. Is the cult of Sophia really "the main motif of Russian Symbolism" (p. 122) and was Soloviev so much influenced by Romantic Germany (p. 129)? The statement on p. 150 about "lack of humor" in the Russian Symbolists must be qualified: no one would deny humor to Andrey Bely. Are all of Bely's *Symphonies* so "deservedly forgotten" (p. 154)? It should at least be admitted that they help to understand a great deal in essential Bely. It is not clear whether in saying that Vyacheslav Ivanov "saluted the Revolution" (p. 164) the author

has in mind the February or the October Revolution. Whatever his subsequent attitude, Ivanov certainly did not salute the Bolshevik Revolution; as late as 1918 he took part in the anti-Bolshevik symposium of essays called *De Profundis*, which was meant as a new *Vekh* and which Poggioli does not mention. (Incidentally, would it not be better to avoid confusion and adopt in English the rendering of *Vekh* first used by some of its English sympathizers when it appeared, and later taken over by Prince Mirsky in his now classical *History of Russian Literature—viz., Landmarks*, instead of *Guideposts* used by Poggioli or *Signposts* which I have also come across?) The juxtaposition of Blok's vision of Christ with Rozanov's "heterodox theology" seems to me far-fetched. Nor does Blok's Christ resemble Tyutchev's image of "Tsar Nebesny."

Some important omissions may be mentioned here, too. Since Professor Poggioli discusses—especially in dealing with the Symbolist and post-Symbolist periods—not only poets but also prose writers, the complete absence from his book of Remizov's name is truly surprising. If there was a Symbolist among non-poets, here is one. Yet Andreev, Gorky, Artsybashev, Kuprin are all mentioned or discussed, and Remizov is not. Among the émigré writers the absence of Shmelyov and Boris Zaitsev is also surprising. In speaking of the aftermath of Symbolism it was necessary to mention the review *Trudy i dni* in which Bely and Ivanov carried on their controversy with Bryusov and Blok about Symbolism and in which some of Bely's important

essays appeared. Among Blok's works his play "The Song of Fate" is not mentioned, although, just as his other plays, it has close links with some of the major themes of his poetry. In speaking of Esenin the author does not mention such an important work as "Chorny chelovek." Tsvetaeva's volume *Posle Rossii* (1928) is not mentioned; nor are some of her longer poems and dramatic works published in exile.

There are also gaps in the bibliography. Suffice it to mention here the English translations of Gumilyov and the translations of three of Blok's lyrical dramas, although in the body of the book there are unacknowledged quotations of passages from Blok's introduction to his dramas as published with the English translations of "The Puppet Show" and "The Stranger" in the *London Slavonic and East European Review*.

With all those blemishes, however, Professor Poggioli's book, I repeat, is a most valuable contribution to the study of modern Russian literature. While he is particularly successful in his discussion of some of the general problems and lines of development, he often also throws an interesting new light on individual poets and works. As an example of this, one may cite his detailed analysis of Blok's poem "The Night Violet."

GLEB STRUVE

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JACKSON, ROBERT L. *Dostoevskij's Underground Man in Russian Literature*. The Hague, Nether-

lands, Mouton & Co., 1957. 223 pp. f 20.—

Mr. Jackson devotes three introductory chapters of his work to tracing out the origins of the *Notes from the Underground* in Dostoevsky's earlier works and to showing the importance of the *Notes* in his later works. The rest of the volume considers the persistence of "underground" elements in the work of more than a dozen writers from Albov and Garshin to Ehrenburg and Leonov. The writers are chosen from three historical periods: "the 1880's," "1900 to 1917," and "after 1917"; and there is some attempt, in the form of capsule literary histories of a page or two, to give some characterization of the periods.

Mr. Jackson explains his intention in the preface in the following way: "This book analyzes the impact of Dostoevsky's *Notes from the Underground* (1864) and its protagonist, the Underground Man, upon Russian Literature. It is concerned with the different ways in which Russian writers responded to *Notes from the Underground*, with the whole complex of 'underground' psychology, philosophy, imagery, variously combined and modified, that makes it possible to speak of a body of prose works as literature of the underground." That the impact of Dostoevsky's *Notes* has been great upon Russian literature cannot be doubted, and the reader will welcome the attempt to define the nature and scope of this impact. He will find some of the studies of individual authors useful and illuminating — particularly those of Gorky and Kuprin; but he will have some question about the

method Mr. Jackson uses to establish the influence of the *Notes* on the works he considers. And since this volume is more than a collection of individual studies, the validity of his method underlies the value of his whole attempt.

Mr. Jackson proceeds by defining a number of qualities that are distinctive of the action, attitudes, and moral state of the Underground Man. In the conclusion he speaks of "permanent estrangement" as the distinctive quality of the Underground Man, and elsewhere he tries, among others, "malice," "self-laceration," "scepticism," "cynicism," "negation of reason," "cosmic humiliation," and "self-alienation." When Mr. Jackson finds a character who is malicious, cynical, self-alienated, or one who lacerates himself, or fulminates against reason, he feels justified in seeing this as evidence of the Underground Man's impact upon the character. Of course, nothing of the kind has been established, and it is precisely the weakness of this procedure that vitiates the usefulness of the volume. Mr. Jackson seems unaware that if "loneliness, alienation, and a feeling of persecution" are possible descriptive qualities of both the Underground Man and Perekonov in Sologub's *Petty Demon*, no meaningful connection has been made. Most of the heroes of Russian literature since 1864, not to speak of the heroes of Western literature, are lonely, self-alienated and feel persecuted; but only a small number of them have felt the specific impact of the Underground Man, at least in any meaningful sense.

Mr. Jackson's working at the

crucial junctures when he makes connections between Dostoevsky's Underground Man and the heroes he considers has an irritating vagueness which seems to be a consequence of his method. Underground qualities are "brought to mind," "recalled," "gathered," or come to birth because of some "atmosphere" or "kinship." Volodia's rehearsed indictment of utilitarian culture in Ehrenburg's *Out of Chaos*, for example, is for him "something of a sortie from the 'underground'"; and "his anticipatory feelings and thoughts are in the spirit of the Underground Man." In Garshin's *The Incident*, "Nadezhda Nikolaevna's lonely and dissolute life recalls that of the Underground Man," and in Pilnyak's *The Volga Falls to the Caspian Sea*, "Poltorak is a symbol of the biological-irrational element rampant in man, very much as the underground man might be said to symbolize this element in his wild irrational self-will."

When Mr. Jackson uses a vocabulary of "bringing to mind," "recalling," and "atmospheres," and when he uses abstractions as broad as "malice" and "cynicism" as the basis of influence, he tells us very little about the specific impact of the Underground Man on Russian literature. But when he points out, as he does occasionally, that a "glass palace" as an image of rationalist perfection appears in both the *Notes* and Kuprin's *River of Life*, he is using a detail specific enough to establish evidence of influence or impact. Similarly, the theme of the "rational organization of life" is too broad and was treated too frequently in the 1920's to serve as a basis of meaningful

connection between Dostoevsky's work and a work of that period; but when Mr. Jackson points out both in the *Notes* and in Zamyatin's *We* the theme finds expression in the arithmetical image of twice two is four as an act of rational faith, then he is again saying something specific enough to point to impact.

I have drawn examples of what I consider as right and wrong procedure from Mr. Jackson's work to remind myself that the problem he sets for himself is real and that the elements of a good work exist in a disappointing work. The revolution in temperament lighted in the nasty, ungrateful spirit of the Underground Man was deep and widespread in its effects. With enough care and disciplined imagination, it can be chronicled. The work remains to be done.

EDWARD WASIOLEK

The University of Chicago

GRYNBERG, R. N. (Ed.) *Vozdushnye Puti (Airways): Almanakh*, New York, R. N. Grynberg, 1959. 287 pp. \$3.00.

This is a collection of sixteen poems and articles, edited by that connoisseur and lover of Russian letters, Roman Grynberg, former editor of *Opyty*. It was privately printed by him in honor of Pasternak's seventieth birthday, the title taken from one of the poet's early stories. That it had to mark his year of death as well, was perhaps the last of those ironies that filled Boris Leonidovich's life and gave him the major theme of his work. But one hopes that this greeting arrived in time for him to see it, for it would have pleased him.

Its contributors, among whom are some of the most gifted of today's émigré writers, either addressed themselves to him directly or dealt with subjects that interested him most: art, language, history, religion, philosophy — and always, Russia.

One of the contributions came from behind the Iron Curtain—a long poem, of which only fragments had hitherto appeared and published here without the author's knowledge. This is "Poem without a Hero" ("Poema bez Geroya") by Anna Akhmatova, that exile in her own land. Among her finest productions, tragically dedicated to "the memory of those who heard it first . . . my friends and fellow citizens who perished in the siege of Leningrad," it is a nostalgic remembrance of the past: of those to whom it is dedicated, "the secret chorus" of whose voices has become its "justification"; of empty homes; of the author's own, lost, former self. It is a poem of exile, in appreciation of those who, whether in "Tashkent or New York," must look through strangers' windows and taste "the air of banishment, bitter as poisoned wine." Tragic but unsentimental, of extraordinarily subtle beauty, it represents, like Pasternak's own work, the spiritual triumph of inspired and disciplined art.

And the entire collection—serious, witty, self-critical, scathing, heartfelt—is in the best tradition of Russian intellectuals. It contains some brilliant comments on Russian literature by George Adamovich; a closely argued essay on the nature of poetry and language by Vladimir Weidlé; a gracefully witty tribute in verse to Pasternak by

Nikolay Morshen; historico-religious discussions of modern civilization by Marc Vishniak, Feodor Stepun, Julius Margolin; a severe scrutiny of the Russian intelligentsia by Nikolay Ulyanov; a clever piece about the verse of Russian prose writers by Vladimir Markov. But all sixteen items, from an early essay on Pushkin by Lev Shestov to Gleb Struve's scholarly analysis of Pasternak's poetic technique, add up to something which breathes of Russia—(*Tam Russki dukh, tam Russiyu pakhnet*)—original, truculent, controversial, minutely attentive to detail and concerned with large issues, bold in ideas and succulent in speech—something that has survived all pressures to level thought and squeeze color out of words.

Anna Akhmatova's poem ends with an image of Russia as she saw her in 1942: shaken by the terror of death, moving towards the East, dry-eyed, wringing her hands. And although in the other contributions, the country does not appear in such palpable form, it is there implicitly, as it has always been in the writing of Russian thinkers. The editor's concise epilogue, "In General Terms," which points out that the ancient problem of Slavophilism and Westernism is being given new solutions by those who, through harsh necessity, have come to know European civilization at first hand and are discovering, like nineteenth-century travellers, that it is different from what in their isolation they had conceived it to be, emphasizes what the whole book bears out and what the title is meant to indicate: that the minds and the spirit of men communicate far above the barriers

which are erected for them in vain by geography and politics.

HELEN MUCHNIC

Smith College

Kniga o Ruskom Evreistve (A Book on the Russian Jewry. From the 1860's to the Revolution of 1917). New York, The Union of Russian Jews, 1960. 590 pp. \$3.50.

This remarkable collection of essays is important not only for its contribution to our knowledge of the history of the Jews in pre-revolutionary Russia—a history in which a number of the contributors took an active part—but also for the light it throws upon some aspects of the Tsarist regime itself. Included in the essays by Alexis Goldenweiser on the legal position of the Jews, by Ilya M. Djur on their economic position, and by Jacob Lestchinsky on the Jewish population and Jewish labor is a mass of documented factual material which forms a basis for the study of problems occasioned by the peculiar position of the Jewish community.

The essay by Mark Aldanov points out that the Jews played hardly any role in the revolutionary movement of the 1870's and that during the reign of Alexander II the mass of the Jewish bourgeoisie were still strongly loyalist in sentiment. Yet by the time of the 1917 Revolution when equality of rights, so long recommended by the more enlightened Russian statesmen, was at last proclaimed, no fewer than 140 discriminatory laws were on the statute book, and the reformist reign of Nicholas II, no less than the reactionary one

of Alexander III, was responsible for still further measures of discrimination and persecution which produced a gulf too wide to bridge between the monarchy and its Jewish subjects. Russian anti-Semitism, like anti-Semitism elsewhere, was made up, as was the legislation it produced, of elements ultimately self-contradictory. Religion, economics, and political security were successively adduced as reasons for measures which caused untold hardships to the Jewish masses, set up internal tensions in their midst, and overburdened and corrupted the administration itself with problems of interpretation and individual exemptions.

Nicholas II's unfitness to rule is shown nowhere more plainly than in his bowing down before the artificially stimulated propaganda of the extreme right, and in his assertion that his conscience forbade his accepting his ministers' advice to give the Jews some relief. Nor can much be made of the argument that the restrictions on the Jews' rights to settlement, education, and employment were seriously intended to help diminish the tensions between them and their fellow-citizens. On the contrary, it was the evidence of official measures of discrimination which encouraged the promoters of pogroms, where these were not the officials themselves. The situation created by this policy reached its culmination after the outbreak of the war, when despite abundant

evidence of the loyalty of the mass of the Jewish population, large-scale expulsions of Jews from the western parts of the country were initiated on plea of military necessity, with many consequential hardships.

And yet, of course, compared with Tsarism's totalitarian successors in Russia and elsewhere, even the worst measures of the period were relatively mild, in that the Jews could still make some organized political protest, even after the Duma electoral regulations were deliberately altered so as to diminish their participation. On the relations between the Jews and other liberal elements, especially the Kadets, the reminiscent chapter by Jacob G. Frumkin is particularly illuminating. And quite apart from politics the Jews made notable contributions to the Russian scene, in the law, scholarship, literature, and the fine arts. Of all this wealth of activity many of the later essays in the volume give a thorough and balanced picture; finally there are essays which look outside Russia itself to the role of Russian Jewry in the Zionist movement and to the life of Russian Jews in the United States. Nor is the religious life of this great community overlooked. All in all this is a work of considerable significance—at once a monument to a vanished world, and an inspiration.

MAX BELOFF

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Book Notices

ADAMOVICH, GEORGH. *Vasilii Alekseevich Maklakov; Politik, Yurist, Chelovek* (Politician, Lawyer, Man). Paris, Friends of Maklakov, 1960. 261 pp. \$3.50.

V. Maklakov (1869-1957) was an outstanding representative of Russian liberalism. A brilliant lawyer and orator, he was a member of the Cadet party, a delegate to the Imperial Duma, and the Provisional Government's ambassador to France. Until his death he lived in Paris taking an active part in émigré affairs, lecturing and writing, notably publishing two books of reminiscences of the First and Second Dumas. He was a man of many gifts and of great personal charm, as all who knew him could testify.

The book of Mr. Adamovich, an émigré writer and critic, is not a formal biography, but rather a biographical essay which should be useful as material for a future biographer. It is based on the author's personal reminiscences, reports of Maklakov's friends, and his published works. The large correspondence which Maklakov carried on in exile was apparently not used, or used only in a very limited way. As yet his letters have not been collected and probably cannot be made public for some time.

The book has some vivid descriptions of the Russian pre-revolutionary scene and an interesting chapter on émigré life. To our understanding of Maklakov as a

public man and politician it adds little to what has already been said in the late Professor Karpovich's essay, "Two Types of Russian Liberalism, Maklakov and Miliukov," in which he drew a contrast between Maklakov and Paul Miliukov as representatives of two traditional types of Russian liberalism: the former descending from Speransky, the latter from Herzen.

The picture of Maklakov that emerges from Mr. Adamovich's book is that of a man of a brilliant legalistic mind, somewhat dilettantish and short-sighted as a political leader, and in his general outlook reminiscent of a Russian eighteenth-century free-thinker, one "for whom history has gone off the right track . . . and should return to the guiding ideals of enlightenment, this time, however, avoiding the developments that led to Robespierre's extremism."

DIMITRI VON MOHRENSCHILDT
Dartmouth College

GOLDWIN, ROBERT A., GERALD STOURZH, and MARVIN ZETTERBAUM (Eds.) *Readings in Russian Foreign Policy*. N. Y. Oxford University Press, 1959. 775 pp. \$2.75.

This book is a collection of selected readings dealing with specific problems in the field of Russian foreign policy. The editors have divided the book into ten sections, and in each section various viewpoints on a particular

question are presented. It is intended that each section be read as a unit, thus providing a student on the college and university level with material which it is hoped will stimulate thought and discussion on a particular question basic to an understanding of Russian foreign policy.

One might say that the central theme of the book is expressed in the title of the final section, "What Guides Russian Foreign Policy?" Certainly the most crucial question for the free world today is an understanding of the elements which comprise Soviet foreign policy, and this last section presents a variety of opinions on the subject. There is a synthesis of those ideas expressed in previous selections which touch upon the messianism of Tsarist Russia, the concept of world revolution in Communist theory, Soviet policy and national interest, and other topics of related importance for an understanding of the component parts of Soviet foreign policy as well as for an understanding of the similarities and distinctions between the foreign policy of Tsarist Russia and that of Soviet Russia.

The volume is a useful addition to the growing literature on Russia in that it brings together in compact form a variety of opinions on numerous significant questions.

JOHN H. HODGSON

Harvard University

LEVINE, ISAAC DON. *The Mind of an Assassin*. New York, Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1960. 232 pp.

This is the story of the man who killed Leon Trotsky. It is a story of perfidy and revenge, of treason

and intrigue, of a man-hunt unique in modern history and frightening in its ramifications. The story unfolded by Isaac Don Levine is well documented, lucidly told, and objectively presented.

It begins in Spain torn by revolution and a civil war. The principal character is a fanatical young Communist named Jaime Ramon Mercader del Rio Hernandez. His father was a nonentity; his mother, a remarkable woman and devout Communist who was christened Eustacia Maria del Rio Hernandez but who preferred to call herself Caridad Mercader. Strong and ruthless, she was ready to kill or betray anyone in the name of The Cause.

Ramon Mercader fulfilled his assignment with the aid of his mother; his mother's lover Leonid Eitingon, a high NKVD officer, and a man of many aliases—General Kotov, General Leonov, Comrade Pablo, Valery, Sakhov, Lyova; a number of assorted spies; and an American girl Sylvia Ageloff, a sex-starved follower of the Trotskyite camp. It was through Sylvia Ageloff that the assassin was able to penetrate into the Trotsky household.

Very deftly Mr. Levine describes the events that led to the final hour of doom, the assassin's progress: his lies, his subterfuges, his stratagems, his trek from Europe to Mexico, his carefully built up preparations for the gory deed, and, finally, his brutal attack on August 20, 1940.

Mercader was seized, arrested, tried and sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. But he never disclosed his true identity. It was mainly due to the efforts of Dr. Alfonso Quiros Cuaron, chief crim-

inologist for the Mexican government, and his associate Professor Gomez Robleda, who jointly conducted a six-month examination of the assassin, that his real identity was established.

"The Mexican government," writes Mr. Levine, "is in the unusual position of having a confessed and convicted murderer on its hands who is adamant in denying his nationality and identity." Mornard-Jacson assumed an imaginary identity and stuck to it throughout his trial and term in prison.

Upon Ramon Mercader's release from prison, the Mexican government could hardly wait to get him out of the country. He is behind the Iron Curtain now, undoubtedly a broken and disillusioned man, as his mother became a broken and disillusioned woman in Moscow, bemoaning her past crimes and, above all, the most heinous crime of her life—that of turning her son into a murderer.

M. K. ARGUS

New York City

LEYDA, JAY. *Kino: A History of the Russian and Soviet Film*. London, Macmillan, 1960. 493 pp. 32 pp. plates. \$9.50.

Jay Leyda's monumental study of the Russian cinema has been eagerly awaited by students of the motion picture for many years. Bits and pieces had appeared earlier, but they are all assembled here in a tightly organized narrative for the first time. Mr. Leyda,

who is generally regarded as the greatest Western authority on the Russian film, studied film technique in the Soviet Union from 1934-1937, spending much of that time with the great Sergei Eisenstein.

However, the greatest value of the book is in its careful examination of the Russian cinema before the Revolution, a subject that receives its first thorough study here. Over a quarter of *Kino* is devoted to this fascinating period, and Mr. Leyda is one of the first scholars to give Leonid Andreev his rightful due as an early and influential supporter of the infant art of the cinema in Russia.

In other ways, the book is disappointing. Many films that excite the curiosity of Western viewers who have not yet had the opportunity to view them are passed over rather quickly in favor of more detailed comments on familiar works. However, the chapter concerning the author's work in the Soviet Union is most interesting, although some of his conclusions will be open to argument. It is disappointing that *Kino* does not treat the post-1950 period in more detail, for this material is hard to locate elsewhere.

Inasmuch as Mr. Leyda's book will probably be the last word on the subject for many years to come, it is a pleasure to report that his literary style is most readable, and his book is well organized. A particularly valuable appendix includes minute details on almost every major film discussed in the book, including cast, production staff, length and date of release. For this information alone, *Kino* deserves a place in every large col-

lection of books on Russia and the Soviet Union.

DAVID STEWART HULL

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The Russian Intelligentsia. DÆDALUS. Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Summer 1960. 235 pp. \$1.25.

Headed by a prefatory note and a foreword by Professor Richard Pipes, this issue contains three articles dealing with the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia, six essays devoted to the Soviet intelligentsia, two comparative studies about the Chinese and Spanish intellectuals, and documentary material pertinent to developments in Soviet scientific thought and the *cause célèbre* of Pasternak's *Dr. Zhivago*.

Among the articles tracing the historical formation and character of the Russian intelligentsia, the study by Mr. M. Malia is useful and instructive, if marred by a one-sided preference for the methodology of logical positivism as the sole criterion of truth. The introduction of the social category of the intelligentsia as a quasi-monastic "order" (occurring briefly in Mr. David Burg's excellent analysis of the moral, political, and cultural plight of the modern Soviet university student) would have been as graphically descriptive and as helpful.

The excellent studies by Messrs. R. Pipes and L. Schapiro on "The Pre-revolutionary Intelligentsia and the Legal Order" and "The Historical Evolution of the Russian Intelligentsia" offer a mine of information, and show the authors'

mastery of their subjects, a couple of minor factual errors and misprints notwithstanding.

The articles by Messrs. L. Haimson and M. Hayward, dealing with literary problems, the changes in the Soviet writers' concept of the "hero," and the general significance of the "thaw," deserve the closest attention of every student of the contemporary Soviet cultural scene. The picture competently drawn by Mr. D. Joravsky in his essay about the "mobilization" of scholars and scientists in the Stalin era to serve purely ideological claims and purposes, makes the reader shudder. It would seem that in the light of this experience the conclusions arrived at by Fr. Gustav Wetter, S.J., an international authority in the field of Soviet philosophy and ideology, in his otherwise profound and brilliant study "Ideology and Science in the Soviet Union," are, perhaps, a little too cautious and optimistic, since there are no guarantees against a return of such impositions, at least as long as the Soviet state does not cease to be a totalitarian ideocracy.

Mr. B. Elkin's article "The Russian Intelligentsia on the Eve of the Revolution" is written from the left-wing Cadet or right-wing Socialist point of view. The author vindicates the old-style intellectuals and is hostile to the "Ve-khi" group.

On the whole, this number of *Daedalus* demonstrates the high level of presentation and penetration of complex problems now attained by American scholarship in its dealings with Russia and the Soviet Union.

HEINRICH A. STAMMLER

The University of Kansas

WHEELER, GEOFFREY. *Racial Problems in Soviet Muslim Asia*. London, Oxford University Press, 1960. 66 pp. \$1.00.

The title of this little book is slightly misleading. Colonel Wheeler, an authority on Central Asia and Iran, has actually written a brief factual survey of political, cultural, demographic, and economic conditions in Soviet Central Asia. The question of relations between the Russians and the natives as races occupies only a minor portion of the study.

The first two chapters tell of the Russian conquest of Central Asia and of the changes brought about by the Bolshevik revolution. In the remaining six chapters the reader is acquainted with the basic problems of a colonial society in

the state of rapid transition. Though the book is free of footnotes and has only a very brief bibliography, it is obviously based on much serious research.

Colonel Wheeler points out how great has been the impact of Russia upon her Muslim colonies in some areas, and how resistant Muslim society has been in other areas. He is cautious in evaluating Russian rule or making predictions for the future, but the tensions inherent in any colonialism are presented clearly and simply. This book can serve as an excellent introduction to the study of an important, though little known, part of the Soviet Union.

FIRUZ KAZEMZADEH

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A Statement on U.S. Public Law 86-90

This Statement is prompted by the deep concern of the undersigned about some recent developments in the approach of the United States Congress towards future American-Russian relations, as expressed by the so-called "Captive Nations" Public Law 86-90 of July 17, 1959 and by Congressional speeches on related matters.

The Public Law 86-90 calls in effect for the complete dismemberment of Russian territories according to an overall geographical pattern which closely resembles the one advanced in the past by Pan-German and Nazi invaders of Russia and of the Soviet Union for the aggressive purpose of their political subjugation and economic control.

The language of P. L. 86-90 is in direct contradiction to that of the relevant Presidential Proclamation which does not enumerate the "Captive Nations" and refers to "Soviet" instead of "Russian" Communism. According to State Department letters of May 6, 1960: "... the language of the Presidential Proclamation represents official United States Government policy which has been described as one of 'non-predetermination' in the absence of some means whereby the views of the subject peoples themselves may be verified." We welcome this attitude and hope that the U. S. Congress will adopt it too.

P. L. 86-90 is largely based on historical misinformation supplied to the U. S. Congress. Thus P. L. 86-90 commits the United States to help some mythical "nations" such as "Cosackia" and "Idel-Ural" in the "recovery of their freedom and independence."

Further, P. L. 86-90 speaks of "Russian communism" and of the "imperialistic policies of Communist Russia," thereby by implication equating the terms "Russian," "imperialistic," and "Communist." This intention has been spelled out in print by Congressional Consultants in the preparation of P. L. 86-90.

For example, it is stated in the Congressional Record for January 21, 1960, p. 919, that the resolution which became P. L. 86-90 clearly identifies the Russian people as the "enemy" of this country. This allegation is completely false.

The 1917-20 Revolution and most of the Civil War in Russia was not fought between the Great Russians and the Minorities as such. The division ran primarily along economic and social lines. Numerous representatives of minorities took part at all levels on the Red side in the struggle. Many others did the same in the ranks of the Russian anti-Communist movements.

Neither do the present realities of the relations between the Great-Russians and the minorities within the Soviet Union conform to the distorted picture given by the separatist propaganda.

The need is clearly indicated for an official review by the U. S. Congress of the erroneous premises of P. L. 86-90 and for its repeal.

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November 17, 1960.

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